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Preface
In the last half-century, information asymmetry has been one of the most
important topics in economics. While it may be beneficial for individuals
to withhold information sometimes, very often, communication helps prevent
undesired outcomes such as market breakdowns or bargaining impasses.
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that investigate
communication in different aspects. The first chapter investigates the impacts
of review systems, which are crucial in online marketplaces today. The sec-
ond chapter discusses Front-of-Package labelling, which is a highly debated
current event. The third chapter analyzes bargaining processes with machine
learning methods. In the following, I provide a brief overview on each chapter.
Chapter 1: In the first chapter, I analyze how review systems influence
firms’ incentives to join a collaborative brand and in turn affect market out-
comes. I investigate a case where firms invest in product quality at heteroge-
neous costs and the investment levels are private. Product information can
be communicated in three ways. Firms can signal through prices and brand
names, and consumers can inspect on quality. I model review systems as an
instrument which lowers consumers’ inspection costs.
I show that review systems encourage cost-efficient firms to invest in prod-
uct quality, which results in higher market efficiency. Furthermore, brand
names become less valuable when review systems are present. Consumers do
not rely on the information brand names provide, and firms have incentives
1
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to detach from a brand and build their own reputation. In addition, while
lack of review systems undermines firms’ incentives to invest, review systems
and market powers of brands lead to inefficiency due to over-investment.
Chapter 2: In the second chapter, I discuss regulations on Front-of-Package
labels. I construct a model where firms can voluntarily adopt a label which
gives incomplete information about their products. I first provide an ex-
planation why the classic unravelling results where all firms adopt the label
((Grossman [1981], Milgrom and Roberts [1986])) may not take place. In my
model, products have multiple attributes and consumers have heterogeneous
preferences. A firm whose products are only valued by certain consumers
lack the incentive to adopt the label. Instead, they prefer that their targeted
consumers conduct search and find them.
I continue with the discussion whether mandating Front-of-Package labels
increases welfare. I show that if firms lack the incentive to adopt labels for
the reason described above, mandating the label decreases welfare because
consumers have to search more. This result comes from pooling on prices,
which weakens the price signal.
Chapter 3: The third chapter explores how machine learning methods help
to extract information in communication process and to predict bargaining
outcomes. Subjects in a lab experiment are paired to engage in a 10-second
bargaining game, and one person in each pair learns about the bargaining
surplus. Two theoretical predictions are tested. Our results suggest that
subjects with private information have the tendency to use equal splits as
focal points and to signal on the bargaining surplus. Moreover, we find that
as process data become richer at a later stage of bargaining, the machine
learning model outperforms static models which only make predictions based
on the size of the surplus. We identify important features and document
Preface 3
their effects using LASSO regression. Among other things, we confirm classic
results such as deadline effects.
While the three chapters have very different applications, they all center
around the topic of communication and complement one another if put in
a broader context. The first chapter investigates how cost reduction in one
communication channel affects communication incentives in other channels.
The second chapter explain how a new information source may counteract
with existing sources and lead to little information transmission. Moreover,
in a market setting where firms’ pricing strategies react to regulations, man-
dating firms to disclose information can do harm to social welfare. The third
chapter sets focus on the content of communication and pioneers in extracting
information using novel methods.
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Chapter 1
Tow Big Brands or Walk Alone
- The Impacts of Review
Systems
1.1 Introduction
Review systems are ubiquitous in online markets today. They are exten-
sively adopted on online platforms and widely accepted by consumers. Rat-
ing platforms profit from their reviews and intermediaries place an emphasis
on product reviews as well. For example, the annual revenue of TripAdvisor,
the largest online review platform, has increased by more than 5 times in the
last decade.1 Also, large platforms such as Amazon, Booking.com and Expe-
dia place star ratings as an important attribute in their ranking algorithms.2
Review systems are an inherent element in modern market places, and they
impact market dynamics in numerous industries.
Existing literature has classified reviews as online word-of-mouth, which is
1According to Statistica, TripAdvisor’s annual revenue in 2008 was 298.25 million, whereas
that in 2018 was 1.6 billion.




often considered as a substitute for certification, brand-signalling and adver-
tising. (Hollenbeck et al. [2019], Dranove and Jin [2010], Jansen et al. [2009])
In this paper, we take a new approach in the interpretation of review sys-
tems, and model them as an instrument to lower consumer inspection costs.
We ask how review systems influence firms’ incentives to join a collaborative
brand and their impacts on market outcomes. We construct a game-theoretic
model with a brand-holder, many firms and many consumers. The brand-
holder owns an established trademark and contracts with the firms on its
usage. Firms with heterogeneous costs consider whether to join the brand or
not, and choose investment levels and prices. Upon arrival, consumers ob-
serve prices and trademark if available. Before making purchasing decisions,
consumers can incur an inspection cost and learn about the product qualities.
We set the benchmark as the case without review systems, and compare
it with the case where reviews are available. First, there is a non-monotonic
relationship between cost-efficiency and branding decisions. Firms with mod-
erate costs adopt the trademark while firms with high or low costs stand
alone. Complementing empirical findings in Hollenbeck [2018], Fang [2019],
Newberry and Zhou [2019], we show that the value of a brand name decreases
because product information is more accessible.
As consumers rely less on brand-signalling, firms also find it less attractive
to contract with the brand-holder. Review systems encourage cost-efficient
firms to detach from the brand. Without the brand name, consumers can-
not tell apart high and low quality products immediately. However, review
systems allow firms to build their own reputation and counter-signal their
quality by not joining the brand. Second, with more information disclosed,
firms have stronger incentives to invest in product quality. Without review
systems, firms generally under-invest in quality. Interestingly, an inefficiency
arises from over-investment when review systems are present. A fraction of
firms over-invest in quality to build their reputation. The profits they earn
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in this case are still higher than if they join the brand and pay a significant
contract fee.
We find that review systems unambiguously improve welfare, but when
compared to the first-best case, an efficiency gap persists even when the cost
of reading reviews becomes arbitrarily small. Cost-efficient firms tend to
over-invest and cost-inefficient firms tend to under-invest. This efficiency gap
results from the market power of the brand-holder and can only be closed if
there is sufficient competition among brand-holders.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses
related literature. Section 1.3 introduces the set-up of our model. Section 1.4
presents our results. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Our paper adds to the vast signalling literature. Signalling games are applied
in various contexts to explain education choices (Spence [1978]), advertising
(Nelson [1970]), gift-exchange (Camerer [1988]), and more recently on voting
behavior (DellaVigna et al. [2016]). While most work suggests a monotonic
relationship between signalling and senders’ types, in our paper, only firms
with moderate costs opt for brand-signalling. The first paper to document
a similar non-monotonic relationship is Feltovich et al. [2002]. In a setting
with one sender and one receiver, Feltovich et al. [2002] establish that if the
receiver has additional information source which is noisy, high and low types
will pool on the same message. In our setting, however, noisy information is
not the key. Rather, it is firms’ endogenous choices of quality investment and
the market power of the brand-holder which drive the result.
In terms of modelling choices, our paper is most related to Stahl and
Strausz [2017], which extends from Bester and Ritzberger [2001]. Stahl and
Strausz [2017] compare buyer and seller certification and show that seller
Chapter 1. 8
certificate improves efficiency because no certificate is also a kind of revelation.
In a similar model setting, our model incorporates both buyer and seller
certification. The brand-holder serves as a third-party certifier who maximizes
profit. Instead of comparing buyer and seller certification, we discuss market
outcomes and focus on change in sellers’ incentive to acquire certificates when
buyers’ certification costs decrease.
1.3 Set-up
There is a brand-holder and a continuum of firms and consumers. The brand-
holder writes a contract for the usage of its brand name. Firms decide whether
they join the brand or not, and how much to invest in the quality of their
products. Firms then set prices for their products. Consumers arrive and
observe prices. They can pay an inspection cost and acquire information
about product quality before they make purchase decisions.
1.3.1 Firms
There is a continuum of firms with mass 1, and each firm produces one unit of
good. Each firm first takes a branding choice, which is denoted by bi ∈ {0, 1},
where bi = 1 means firm i joins the brand. After firms took their branding
decisions, they decide on how much to invest in quality and set prices for their
products. Each firm has a firm-specific cost component denoted by ci, which
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. A product can be of three quality levels:
high, medium and low, which are denoted by qh, qm, and ql respectively, with
qh > qm > ql. Denote ei firm i’s investment choice. Then ei ∈ {eh, em, el},
where eh > em > el. Firms’ investment choices translate into quality with
certainty. For example, if firm i chooses ei = eh, then the product is of high
quality qh. The total cost of firm i is ciei, where both components are private
information to the firm. We assume that ql ≥ el so that it is socially optimal
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for all firms to stay in the market. We allow for mixed pricing strategies,
but firms are restricted to randomizing over countably many prices. 3 We
denote σi the mixed strategy of firm i and pi the price firm i sets if it is a
pure strategy.
1.3.2 Brand-holder
There is one brand-holder in this world. The brand-holder does not partic-
ipate in manufacturing. It owns a trademark which firms can use upon its
agreement. For simplicity, we abstract away the monitoring behavior of the
brand-holder. Also, we assume that the brand-holder cannot impose invest-
ment choice eh. Therefore, the brand-holder offers a contract which entails
fixed fee F and minimal investment level em. The brand-holder can only offer
one contract to all firms. Namely, screening through contracts is not possible.
For the ease in analysis, we assume that a firm accepts the contract if it is
indifferent.
We focus on the case where the brand-holder can only secure the invest-
ment level em. This setting corresponds to the case where monitoring costs
are high, or when the brand-holder cannot contract on every aspect that
contributes to consumers’ perception of quality.
1.3.3 Consumers
Without loss of generality, we assume that exactly one consumer arrives at
each firm. Consumers observe listed prices and firms’ branding decisions upon
arrival. Denote consumers’ beliefs µ(p, b) = (µh, µm, µl), where p and b are
price and branding choices and µh + µm + µl = 1. Before making purchase
decisions, consumers can choose whether to inspect the quality of the good.
If a consumer inspects, she incurs inspection cost k and fully learns about
3This restriction is often adopted to avoid measure problems. See Bester and Ritzberger
[2001] and Stahl and Strausz [2017]
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the quality. We allow consumers to randomize their inspection strategy and
denote γ(p, b) the probability that a consumer inspects upon receiving price
signal p and branding signal b. If a consumer purchases without inspection,
her expected utility is E[q] − p, where E[q] = µhqh + µmqm + µlql. If she
purchase after learning about the quality being q, her utility is q − p − s.
If consumers do not purchase from the firm they arrive at, they leave the
market with reservation utility normalized to 0. We assume that consumers
purchase if they are indifferent.
Our results do not hinge on specific relationships between exogenous pa-
rameters. However, to prevent from discussing a degenerate case, we assume
that






The inequalites in 1.1 guarantees that in social optimum, all investment levels
are chosen by some firms, and that all firms should stay in the market. To
see this, observe that if every firm can set the price exactly to the quality it
chooses, a firm i with ci = qm−qlem−el is indifferent between investing in low quality
and medium quality since πi(em) = qm − ciem = ql − ciel = πi(el). Similarly,
a firm with ci = qh−qmeh−em is indifferent between choosing high and medium
quality. Therefore, it is optimal for a firm to choose medium quality if its






< 1 implies that
some firms should produce low-quality products in this case, and qh−qm
eh−em
> 0
guarantees that choosing high quality is optimal for some firms as well.
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1.3.4 Time Structure
The game has 4 stages.4 At the first stage, the brand-holder designs the
contract and sets the contract fee F . In the second stage, firms first decide
whether to accept the contract or not. If a firm accepts the contract, then
the investment level has to be at least em. If a firm does not accept the
contract, it can freely decide on the investment level. Firms then set prices
at the second stage. At the third stage, consumers arrive and observe prices
and branding choices, then they decide whether to inspect the quality at cost
k or not. At the last stage, consumers make purchase decisions and payoffs
realize accordingly.
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
consists of (F ∗, {b∗i }, {σ∗i }, {e∗i }, µ∗, γ∗, Y ∗), where the brand-holder’s contract
fee, every firm’s branding, pricing, investment choices and every consumer’s
inspection and purchasing decisions are optimal, and consumers’ beliefs are
consistent. All proofs are included in the appendix.
1.4 Results
In this chapter, we first explore the social optimal allocation. We then estab-
lish common properties of the equilibria in this game. We set the case where
inspection is impossible as our benchmark, and compare it to the case where
consumer inspection is available with a cost. Finally, we show comparative
statics and asymptotic properties of the equilibrium we focus on.
4Mathematically, an equilibrium in our game is equivalent to a stationary equilibrium in
the repeated game where consumers can incur costs to read reviews generated in the
previous period. In this dynamic setting, even though firms’ incentives are not affect by
















Figure 1.1: Social Optimum
1.4.1 Social Optimum
Before we begin with our analysis, it is helpful to explore the socially op-
timal case. In this case, prices and contract fee are irrelevant as they are
transfers among players. If a benevolent social planner has the power to
impose investment decisions, firms with lower investment costs should in-
vest more in quality. If a firm’s cost component ci is qh−qmeh−em , whether it in-
vest in high or medium quality yields the same level of welfare gain because
qh − qh−qmeh−em · eh = qm −
qh−qm
eh−em
· em. Similarly, whether a firm with the cost
component level qm−ql
em−el
invests either in medium or low quality does not affect
the welfare level. Therefore, firms whose cost components ci are less than
qh−qm
eh−em
should invest in high quality, those with ci in between qh−qmeh−em and
qm−ql
em−el
should invest in medium quality, and those with ci greater than qm−qlem−el should
invest in low quality. Figure 1.1 summarizes the welfare and investment levels
of each firm in the social optimal allocation. The sum of the shaded area is
the welfare level in social optimum.
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1.4.2 Preliminary Results
In this section, we establish properties of equilibria in this game. For sim-
plicity, if a firm chooses to join the brand, we say it is in the brand market.
Otherwise, it is in the stand-alone market.
Lemma 1.1. In equilibrium, given any price p and branding decision b, con-
sumers assign non-zero weight on the lowest possible quality in their beliefs,
i.e. µm(p, 1) > 0 and µl(p, 0) > 0 for all p.
Lemma 1.1 states that rational consumers should believe there can be low-
quality goods in the stand-alone market, and medium-quality goods in the
brand market. If a firm chooses bi = 1, then the lowest possible investment
level is medium. Otherwise, the lowest possible investment level is low. Since
production costs increase with quality, it is straight-forward that if consumers
assign 0 probability to the lowest quality, firms have an incentive to deviate
to a lower investment level.
Lemma 1.2. If consumers inspect with zero probability at stage 3, then any
belief which induces such action must assign probability 1 to the lowest possible
quality in equilibrium.
Lemma 1.2 states that for any price the consumer observes, if she decides
not to search, she believes that the quality is medium if she is in the brand
market, and low if she is in the stand-alone market. If consumers do not
inspect, the unique best response of firms is to invest as little as possible.
Therefore, if consumers do not inspect in equilibrium, they must expect the
lowest possible quality.
1.4.3 Benchmark Case: No Inspection
As benchmark, we discuss the case where inspection is not possible. Propo-
sition 1.1 summarizes the unique PBE in this case.
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Proposition 1.1. If inspection is not possible, there exists a unique PBE
where
• only firms with ci ≤ ĉ = 12
qm−ql
em−el
contract with the brand-holder,
• firms who contract with the brand-holder choose em and set prices at
qm,
• stand-alone firms choose el and set prices at ql,
• the brand-holder sets fixed fee F = qm−ql2 .
Proposition 1.1 follows immediately from Lemma 1.1 and 1.2. When in-
spection is impossible, Lemma 1.2 states that the only equilibrium is where all
branded firms produce medium-quality goods and all stand-alone firms pro-
duce low-quality goods. Since there is no competition among firms, branded
firms set prices at qm and stand-alone firms ql. Expecting these outcomes at
later stages, the brand-holder’s problem is equivalent to a cut-off problem.
If a firm with cost-component c can profit more in the brand market, then





s.t. qm − ciem − F ≥ ql − ciel ∀ci ≤ ĉ
ql − ciel ≥ qm − ciem − F ∀ci > ĉ
The incentive constraints pin down the contract fee F to qm− ql− ĉ(em− el).




Our benchmark analysis shows that without inspection, no firm invests













Figure 1.2: Benchmark Equilibrium
mass of firms who offer at least medium quality is lower than that in social






in the stand-alone market. However, in the equilibrium price scheme, it is
welfare improving for them to offer medium-quality goods. Welfare losses
arise for two reasons. First, when inspection is not available, firms lose the
incentive to invest in high quality. Second, since the brand-holder is the
monopolist of the brand signal, optimal contract fee is high, which drives
some firms away from the brand market.
1.4.4 Inspection
We now turn to the case where inspection is possible. The benchmark equilib-
rium in the previous section is still an equilibrium when inspection is possible.
However, it is no longer unique. When inspection is possible and inspection
costs are sufficiently low, there exists an equilibrium where high quality goods
are produced in the stand-alone market. To solve for the game systematically,
we first characterize a crucial property of equilibrium beliefs in Lemma 1.3:
Lemma 1.3. In any equilibrium belief, if a certain quality is assigned non-
Chapter 1. 16
zero probability in the brand market, it must be assigned zero probability in
the stand-alone market, and vice versa. In other words, a certain quality level
can only exist in at most one market.
Note that we do not allow for randomization in branding decisions. Hence,
fixing the effort level, costs of a firm are identical in both markets. Fixing
the investment level, when firms make branding decisions, they only take into
account the revenue gain in the brand market and the associated contract fee.
Therefore, if one firm finds it worthwhile to join the brand, all other firms
producing on the same quality level should also join the brand.
Proposition 1.2 establishes the existence of another equilibrium, which is
the main focus of this paper.5
Proposition 1.2. When inspection cost is sufficiently low, there exists a PBE
with cut-offs c, c̄, where
• a firm joins the brand if and only if its cost component is in the range
[c, c̄],
• if a firm joins the brand, it invests in medium quality,
• if a firm is in the stand-alone market, it invests in high quality if its
cost component is less than c and low quality otherwise
• High-quality goods are of high price, medium-quality goods are of medium
price, and the price of low-quality goods is randomized between the high
price and a low price.
• Consumers only inspect upon high price in the stand-alone market.
We now sketch the proof for Proposition 1.2. Denote the equilibrium high,
medium and low prices ph, pm, and pl, respectively. Denote σ the probabil-
ity that a low-quality good is listed with a high price in equilibrium, then
5Other equilibria are discussed in the appendix.
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consumers’ beliefs upon observing price p and brand b is
µ(p, b) =

(0, 1, 0) if (p, b) = (pm, 1)
(ρ, 0, 1− ρ) if (p, b) = (ph, 0)
(0, 0, 1) otherwise
where ρ = c
c+σ(1−c̄) is the probability that a high-price good is of high quality.
We show the existence of this equilibrium ("inspection equilibrium" here-
after) by backward induction. First, at the consumption stage, consumers
purchase if the expected quality is greater than the listed price. On the equi-
librium path, branded firms set prices at pm, and stand-alone firms set prices
at either ph or pl. If consumers observe pl from an stand-alone firm, they
believe the good is of low quality. If the price is pm and the firm joins the
brand, µ(pm, 1) = (0, 1, 0). Therefore, consumers’ purchasing decision can be
simplified to purchase if pl ≤ ql, pm ≤ qm and if ph ≤ ρqh + (1− ρ)ql without
inspection, and ph ≤ qh after inspection and q = qh.
In the inspection stage, given the beliefs stated above, consumers do not
inspect if a stand-alone firm charges a low price or if a branded firm charges
a medium price. In these cases, consumers assign probability 1 to a certain
quality level, and therefore have no incentive to inspect. When a stand-alone
firm charges a high price ph, consumers inspect if
ρ(qh − ph)− k ≥ ρqh + (1− ρ)ql − ph. (1.2)
Denote γ∗(ph, 0) the optimal probability that consumers inspect in this case.
When equation A.3 holds with equality (consumers’ indifference condition
for inspection hereafter), consumers are indifferent between inspection and
no inspection. Therefore, any randomization between inspection and no in-
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spection is a best response. Therefore, it is also optimal for consumers to
inspect with probability γ∗(ph, 0) = ph−plph to support the equilibrium.
Expecting optimal inspection and purchase strategies, firms choose op-
timal prices and quality levels. Since there is no competition among firms,
it is straight-forward that branded firms price at p∗m = qm and choose em in
this equilibrium. Consumers believe that a branded firm produces at medium
quality with certainty, so branded firms can charge at consumers’ willingness
to pay for the medium-quality good. Moreover, because consumers do not
inspect a branded firm, it is optimal for them to choose the lowest possible
quality em. On the other hand, equilibrium strategies in the stand-alone mar-
ket construct a semi-separating equilibrium. Regarding the low price, given
that consumers purchase if pl ≤ ql, the optimal low price p∗l = ql.
Hence, for any stand-alone firm i, the expected profit
E[πi(pi, ei)]

p− ciel if (pi, ei) = (ql, el)
p− cieh if (pi, ei) = (ph, eh)
(1− γ∗)p− ciel if (pi, ei) = (ph, el)
where ph satisfies equation A.3.
Note that if γ∗ is equal to ph−ql
ph
, then (1 − γ∗)ph = ql, so a firm who
chooses ei = el is indifferent between setting prices at ph and ql. In the
optimization problem of the firms, consumers are indifferent between inspec-
tion, purchasing without inspection and leaving the market when the price
is ph in the stand-alone market. This is because firms who invest in high
quality cannot differentiate themselves through price signalling. Since firms
who invest in low quality will always have the incentive to mimic them, high
quality products have to be set at a price which is equal to consumer’s ex-
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Figure 1.3: Inspection Equilibrium







2s(1−c̄) . We defer the proof that
these strategies are incentive compatible in the appendix.





s.t. qm − ciem − F ≥ max.{ph − cieh, ql − ciel} ∀ ci ∈ [c, c̄],
(1.3)











Figure 1.3 illustrates the equilibrium strategies of firms and the brand-
holder graphically. In the inspection equilibrium, firms with very low and
high cost components (ci < c or ci > c̄) are in the stand-alone market. Firms





Firms with high ci invest in low quality and mimic the high-quality firms
with probability σ = c[qh−ql−2s−
√
(qh−ql)(qh−ql−4s)]
2s(1−c̄) in pricing. When consumers




if the listed price is ph. Consumers do not inspect in the stand-alone
market if they face price ql since it is obvious that the good is of low quality.
If consumers do not inspect, they always purchase the good. If consumers
inspect, then they purchase if the good is of high quality. In the brand
market, on the other hand, the brand name already signals medium quality
to consumers. Therefore, consumers do not inspect and always purchase the
good because a branded firm always prices at qm. Expecting the equilibrium
strategies in the later stages, the brand-holder sets the contract fee F to
miximize its profit.
Similar to the benchmark case, firms with high costs are in the stand-alone
market because of the high contract fee. Unlike in the benchmark case, firms
with low costs self-select into the stand-alone market because consumers can
inspect on quality. Since consumers can verify product quality, these firms
have incentives to produce high-quality goods in order to extract higher mark-
ups. Firms who join the brand are those who have moderate firm-specific cost
components ci. They do not find it worthwhile to build their own reputation
in the stand-alone market, but their costs are not that high that they are
driven out of the brand market.
1.4.5 Comparison between Benchmark and Inspection
Equilibrium
In this section, we compare the results in the benchmark equilibrium and the
inspection equilibrium more in depth.
Proposition 1.3. Welfare level in the inspection equilibrium is unambigu-
ously higher than in the benchmark equilibrium.
There are two reasons for the result in Proposition 1.3. First, firms which
are more cost-efficient offer high-quality goods in the inspection equilibrium.
Recall in the socially optimal case, the social planner will impose high-quality
Chapter 1. 21
investment for firms whose cost components are below the threshold qh−qm
eh−em
.
While these firms lack the incentives to invest in high quality in the bench-
mark equilibrium, the reduction of consumers’ inspection costs in the inspec-
tion equilibrium enables them to profit through investments. Second, less
firms which should invest in medium quality are left out in the stand-alone
market and produce low-quality goods. In the benchmark case, the brand-
holder contracts with firms who have lower costs, and leave out a sufficient
mass of firms with its high contract fee. In the inspection equilibrium, the
low cost firms will not join the brand. Therefore, the brand-holder has to
adjust its contract fee to attract firms. This results in a reduction of contract
fee, and more of the firms who invest in medium quality in social optimum
joining the brand.
Proposition 1.4. Compared to the benchmark case, the profit of every firm
is weakly higher. Moreover, the difference decreases with the firm-specific cost
component.
Proposition 1.4 states that firms’ profits are weakly higher in the inspec-
tion equilibrium. This result suggests that firms only profit from low inspec-
tion costs. The intuition is as follows. In the inspection equilibrium, the
contract fee is lower. The marginal firm c which is indifferent between joining
the brand and producing a high quality good in the stand-alone market is
strictly better-off. If the marginal firm would join the brand in the bench-
mark equilibrium, the firm benefits from the lowered contract fee. If it does
not join the brand in the benchmark case, its profit is equal to selling a low
quality good at price ql, which is strictly lower than producing a high-quality
good in the inspection equilibrium. Therefore, all firms who have a lower cost
component than c have a higher profit, and since their revenues are the same,
a lower cost component implies a higher profit. Moreover, c̄, the cost com-
ponent of the marginal firm which is indifferent between joining the brand
and producing a low-quality good in the stand-alone market, is strictly larger
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than ĉ, the marginal firm-specific cost component level in the benchmark case.
Therefore, for firms with cost components greater than c, they either profit
from a lower contract fee if their cost components are lower than c̄, or they
stay indifferent in the stand-alone market.
1.4.6 Comparative Statics and Asymptotic Properties
In this section we discuss the comparative statics and asymptotic properties
with respect to inspection cost k.
Proposition 1.5. In the inspection equilibrium, the high price ph in the
stand-alone market increases as inspection costs decrease. As the inspection
cost approaches 0, this price approaches qh.




2 . It is straight-forward to see that
ph decreases in k, and that as k approaches 0, ph approaches qh. It is intuitive
that as the inspection cost decreases, firms who produce high-quality goods
are more likely to build reputation in the stand-alone market. When inspec-
tion is almost free, these firms can almost charge at consumers’ willingness
to pay for the high-quality goods qh.
Corollary 1.1. As the inspection cost decreases, the fraction of branded firms,
given by c̄ − c, decreases. As the inspection cost approaches 0, this fraction





], which is one half of the socially optimal level.
Both c and c̄ are increasing functions of ph, which is a decreasing function
of the inspection cost k. Therefore, c and c̄ also decrease with k. This means
that as the inspection cost decreases, there will be more low cost firms going
in the stand-alone market, and more high cost firms accepting the contract.
However, the marginal impact of inspection costs k on c is greater than that
on c̄. Therefore, as inspection costs k decreases, the fraction of firms joining
the brand decreases.
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Corollary 1.1 shows that for any arbitrarily small inspection cost k, an in-
efficiency arises and some firms do not choose their social optimal investment
levels. There are more firms in the stand-alone market than is socially opti-
mal. Also, there are more high-equality goods as well as low-quality goods.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the inefficiency graphically. We know by Lemma 1.3
that on equilibrium path, consumers believe that medium-quality goods only
exist in the brand market. Therefore, the brand-holder acts as a monopolist
of medium-quality signalling technology. The brand-holder faces a linear
demand by firms who want to access such technology. Consequently, the
brand-holder sets the contract fee F to extract monopolist profit. If there is
competition among brand-holders, such dead-weight loss can be eliminated.
Corollary 1.2. As the inspection cost decreases, the brand-holder’s profit
decreases.
Both the fraction of branded firms and the contract fee decrease as the
inspection cost decreases. Therefore, the brand-holder’s profit unambiguously
decreases.
1.5 Conclusion
We set up a game-theoretic model to analyze the impact of reviews systems
on firms’ branding choices and market outcomes. In our model, emergence of
review systems is equivalent to a decrease in consumers’ costs of quality in-
spection. We set our benchmark as the case where such costs are so high that
inspection becomes impossible. When inspection is not available, firms have
stronger incentives to join a brand in order to signal quality. A brand-holder,
who has established its reputation in the market, is able to extract a signif-
icant share of profits from firms who use its trademark. Inefficiencies arise
for two reasons in this case: First, firms who join the brand lack incentives
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to provide products with higher quality than demanded by the brand-holder.
Second, due to the high contract fees, there are too few branded firms.
Our first finding is that review systems mitigates the aforementioned ef-
ficiency problems. We show that for sufficiently low inspection costs, there
exists an equilibrium where high-quality goods are produced by stand-alone
firms who do not join the brand, and that more firms are included in the
brand. High quality goods are pooled in the stand-alone market with low
quality goods. However, low inspection costs enable consumers to search and
tell these products apart. Moreover, firms profit from review systems, and the
increase in profits increases with their cost efficiency. The value of a brand
name is lower, for the brand-holder’s profit decreases.
We conduct comparative statics analysis and find that as the inspect cost
reduces, the number of firms joining the brand decreases. Moreover, the price
of high-quality goods increases, and the brand-holder’s revenue decreases.
Interestingly, we find that inefficiency arises from over-investment in quality.
When the brand-holder has market power, a fraction of cost-efficient firms
over-invest in quality because profits are higher to stand alone than to join
the brand.
Our results complement existing empirical findings of the decreased values
of brand names. We emphasize that in addition to information disclosure, re-
view systems also affect firms’ branding choices and their incentives to invest.
However, future research is required to verify other mechanisms of review sys-





Front-of-Package (FoP) labels are designed to help consumers understand
nutrition contents better and faster. According to WHO, 17 million people
die from cardiovascular diseases each year. Many of those premature deaths
could have been circumvented by improving diets (Anand et al. [2015]). Diet
improvement requires better nutrition choices. Yet, a survey conducted by
Christoph et al. [2018] shows that only one third of people read nutrition
contents when buying groceries.
The health benefits of FoP labels can be considerable. A field experiment
study suggests that the mere effect of offering FoP labels results in reduction
of calories intake at lunch by 10%. Similar supporting evidence is also found in
Ducrot et al. [2016], Khandpur et al. [2018], and Talati et al. [2019]. However,
take-up rates of FoP labels are low among Eurpean countries.1
1In 2019, the take-up rate of Nutri-score in France is only 25%, and in countries like
Germany and Italy, strong resistance against Nutri-score persists. For details, see the
report "Food Labelling System, Nutri-Score, Gains Momentum in Europe" on Quality
25
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In this paper, we provide an explanation for the low take-up rate of FoP
labels, which contradicts the classic unravelling result in the information dis-
closure literature (Grossman [1981], Milgrom and Roberts [1986]). We show
that low take-up rates can be a result of the interplay between FoP labels
and existing nutrition facts labels.
FoP labels face a trade-off between informativeness and interpretability. In
order to provide consumers nutrient information at a glance, the labels often
do not contain exact nutrition amounts but rather letter grades, warning signs
or traffic lights. While nutrition facts tables on the back of packages seem to
complement FoP labels well, we show that they can in fact result in low FoP
adoption rates.
We construct a game-theoretic model and establish that (i) heterogeneous
consumer preferences and (ii) potential other sources of information result
in low FoP adoption rates. These assumptions are satisfied in the grocery
industry as well as many general settings.
In our model, a product has two attributes. Consumers assign different
weightings among attributes, but within each attribute, the product is verti-
cally differentiated. Specifically, every attribute can be of high or low quality.
One attribute is valued by all types of consumers while the other attribute
is only valued by a certain type of consumer. For example, a body-builder
may value protein content more than an average consumer, and a person on
kidney dialysis may be more cautious on sodium content.
If firms can only signal through the FoP label, all firms adopt the label
voluntarily. This result holds even though the label cannot fully disclose the
quality of each attribute in our model. Likewise, it continues to hold if con-
sumers can search for nutrition information at a low cost, FoP label adoption
is costless and consumers’ preferences are homogeneous. However, when both
Assurance and Food Safety magazine and reports on criticism in Germany and Italy on
https://www.foodnavigator.com/.
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of our key assumptions hold, only the products with a high quality attribute
that is valued by all consumers value will adopt FoP labels. Producers with
products which have high quality only on the other attribute find it more
profitable to avoid the FoP label. Instead of showing the FoP label, these
producers induce consumers who value their quality to search. They charge
a higher price for their targeted consumers and earn a higher profit.
We continue with the welfare analysis of mandatory FoP labels. While
madatory FoP labels are in demand in Europe2, we show that mandating FoP
labels may lead to a decrease in social welfare. When FoP labels are manda-
tory, price signalling yields more diluted information. Products grouped to-
gether by FoP labels will have similar prices, and consumers who value a
certain attribute has to search more frequently.
The contributions of our paper are two-fold. First, we offer a theoretical
explanation of the observed low adoption rates of FoP labels. Second, we
compare two different regulation schemes: mandatory and voluntary FoP
label adoption. Our results not only establish a fundamental cause of low
adoption rates but also highlights firms’ adaptation to regulations.
Despite its focus on the application of Front-of-Package labels, the insight
of our paper can be extended to a broader setting. In fact, it can be applied to
any market with an aggregated signal of multiple attribute. E.g., on an online
platform with a 5-star review system, those reviews serve as a simplified signal
similar to FoP labels. Another example are GPAs that serve as a vague signal
of the students’ personal attributes. Moreover, for products whose attribute
qualities cannot be easily transmitted to consumers, such as laptops and
smartphones, a potential demand for such simplified signals can be expected.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
2In April 2020, a joint letter requesting mandatory Nutri-score was sent to the European
commission by European parliament members, consumer organizations, public health
scholars as well as a list of retailers. For the letter content, see the European Consumer
website for reference number: Ref.: BEUC-X-2020-029/MGO/cm.
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related literature. Section 2.3 introduces the set-up of our model. Section 2.4
presents our results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper extends the vast literature on information disclosure. Under rea-
sonable assumptions, Grossman and Hart [1980], Grossman [1981] and Mil-
grom and Roberts [1986] establish that a firm will voluntarily disclose its
private information to consumers. In a vertically differentiated market, a
firm with high quality products can charge a higher mark-up through quality
disclosure. If consumers are rational, other firms will also disclose informa-
tion in order to separate their products from those with lower qualities. This
result is known as the "unravelling" result in information disclosure literature.
While existing literature focuses on how certain market structures or ir-
rationality of consumers may jeopardize disclosure3, our paper suggests that
an incomplete information structure also undermines disclosure incentives.
The most related work to our paper is Ghosh and Galbreth [2013]. Similar
to our setting, in Ghosh and Galbreth [2013], communication is two-sided.
Firms can disclose product quality and consumers can conduct search as well.
While Ghosh and Galbreth [2013] find that firms disclose less information
when search costs are high, we document how low search costs lead firms to
counter-signal by avoiding disclosure.
Our paper also adds to the vast discussion of mandatory disclosure. Even
though mandatory disclosure ensures more information transmission, the lit-
3For example, Jovanovic [1982] shows that if disclosure is not costless, the classic unravelling
result is not obtained. In Fishman and Hagerty [2003], consumers may be uninformed even
after firms disclose. Board [2009] shows competition among firms may hinder disclosure.
Levin et al. [2009] discuss disclosure incentives in a horizontally differentiated market.
Guo and Zhao [2009] compare cases where firms disclose sequentially or simultaneously.
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erature generally agrees that whether mandating disclosure increases welfare
heavily depends on the context.4
In terms of modelling choices, our model is closest to Mayzlin and Shin
[2011], who investigate why firms engage in uninformative advertisement. As
an alternative to the "money burning" story in Nelson [1974], Mayzlin and
Shin [2011] show that when both the firm and the consumer can invest in
communication, a producer of high-quality goods has an incentive to engage
in uninformative advertisement, inducing consumers to conduct search. While
the research questions are different, the intuition behind our main results is
similar to that in Mayzlin and Shin [2011]. If a firm’s product is highly valued
by consumers, the firm may have the incentive to avoid disclosure, inviting
its targeted consumers to study the product.
2.3 Set-up
There is one firm and one consumer. The firm produces a product with un-
certain quality which is private to the firm. The firm can voluntarily opt
for a label that indicates, but does not fully disclose product quality. The
consumer learns about the price of the product and, if available, the infor-
mation about product quality through the label. Before making purchasing
decisions, the consumer considers whether or not to engage in a costly search
after which product quality is fully disclosed.
4Positive effects of mandatory disclosure are documented theoretically in Fishman and
Hagerty [2003], and empirically in Mathios [2000] in the salad dressing industry and
Frondel et al. [2020] in the German housing market. Negative effects are documented
theoretically in Jovanovic [1982]. Ispano and Schwardmann [2018] also discovers that if
consumers are cursed (Eyster and Rabin [2005]), partial mandatory disclosure decreases
welfare. In a financial setting, Jayaraman and Wu [2019] document lower efficiency re-
sulting from mandatory disclosure empirically.
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2.3.1 Firm
The firm produces one unit of a product with two attributes, denoted by
α and β. Both attributes can be of either high or low quality with equal
probabilities. Assume that there is no correlation between quality levels of
the two attribute. We write α ∈ {A, a} and β ∈ {B, b}, where capital letters
represent high qualities. Therefore, the firm’s type θ, characterized by its
product, can be one of the following: (A,B), (A, b), (a,B), or (a, b), and the
ex ante probabilities of each type is 14 . For simplicity, we say the firm is of
high type (θ = h) if both attributes are of high quality, and low type (θ = l)
if neither is of high quality. If the product is of high quality only on the α
(β) attribute, we say the firm is of mα (mβ) type (θ = mα (mβ)).
After the firm learns about its type, it can choose whether or not to adopt
a label. The information structure of the label will be discussed in detail.
The adoption of the label is costless. Denote sθ the label adoption strategy of
the firm with type θ with sθ ∈ {0, 1} for θ ∈ {h,mα,mβ, l} where 1 denotes
adoption and 0 no adoption. After the firm decides on the labelling strategy,
it sets a price for its product. For simplicity, there are no production costs.
Thus, the firm is a profit maximizer and its profit depends solely on the price
the consumer pays if transaction take place.
2.3.2 Consumer
The consumer can be of two types: the niche type (N) or the mass type
(M). Denote ω the probability that the consumer is the niche type. The
type-dependent utility functions of the consumer are as follows:
UN = λ · 1(α = A) +1(β = B) + u0
UM = 1(β = B) + u0
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First, every product generates base utility u0 > 0 for the consumer.5 Second,
regardless of the consumer’s type, a product with high quality on the β at-
tribute generates unit utility. Finally, the niche type derives utility from a
product with high quality on the α dimension, but the mass type does not.
λ > 0 represents the weighting of the α attribute relative to the β attribute
for the niche type consumer.6
For simplicity, we call the α attribute the "niche attribute", and the β
attribute the "mass attribute" hereafter. Also, we call the consumer of type
N the "niche consumer", and type M the "mass consumer".
Upon arrival, the consumer observes the price of the product and the label
if available. Regardless of the label, the consumer can learn the quality of
attributes at a search cost c > 0. The consumer then decides on whether to
purchase the product or not. If transaction does not take place, the consumer
is left with reservation utility normalized to 0. We assume that the consumer
buys if she is indifferent between buying and leaving the market.
2.3.3 Information Structure






Table 2.1: Information Structure
We model a simple information structure for product quality. Essentially,
5In general, u0 can be normalized to zero. This assumption simplifies the discussion of the
equilibrium we focus on. See appendix for details.
6Our results are still valid if the α attribute also generates utility for the mass type con-
sumer. The key assumption for our results is the heterogeneity of relative attribute weight-
ings among consumers.
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the label shows the number of high-quality attributes of the product. If both
α and β attributes are of high quality, the label is 2 (L = 2). If only one
attribute is of high quality, regardless of which attribute it is, the label marks
1 (L = 1). Finally, if neither attribute is of high quality, the label shows 0
(L = 0).
Our choice of modelling not only simplifies the analysis but also preserves
the essence of Front-of-Package labels as well as other uni-dimensional signals
such as reviews. A product with low fat and high sugar content many be
grouped together with another product with high fat and low sugar content.
A restaurant which has a mediocre star rating may have not-so-outstanding
food or service. Thus, the signal structure is a simple representation which
preserves the trade-off between informativeness and interpretability.
2.3.4 Timeline
The timeline of the game is summarized in Table 2.2:
Period 0 Nature draws the type of the firm and the consumer.
Period 1 The firm learns about its type θ and chooses labelling strategy sθ.
Period 2 The firm sets prices pθ.
Period 3 The consumer observes product price and label if available.
Period 4 The consumer decides whether to investigate (at cost c) quality or not.
Period 5 The consumer makes purchase decisions. Payoffs realize accordingly.
Table 2.2: Timeline
2.3.5 Equilibrium Concept
Throughout this paper, we focus on Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBE)
which survive D1-criterion refinement (Banks and Sobel [1987]). We allow
the firm to set mixed pricing strategies among finite prices and the consumer
to play mixed investigation strategies.
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2.4 Results
In this chapter, we present our findings. We first show that unravelling is
an equilibrium if consumers have homogeneous preferences, or if they cannot
conduct search. We then characterize the equilibrium we focus on, which only
exists if label adoption is voluntary. In this equilibrium, the firm with typemα
does not adopt the label in order to induce the niche consumer to conduct
costly search. The type mα firm can therefore target the niche consumer
and earn a higher profit. We then discuss the case where label adoption is
mandatory. We show that making the adoption mandatory may decrease
welfare. Proofs to all results in this paper can be found in the Appendix.
2.4.1 Preliminary Results
Before presenting our main results, we show that either of our two main
assumptions, heterogeneous preferences or alternative source of information,
does not undermine disclosure. Rather, it is the interplay of the two that
gives rise to low adoption rates.
Proposition 2.1. If the consumer cannot investigate product quality, then
there exists an equilibrium where all types except the l type firm adopt the
label.
Proposition 2.1 shows that the classic unravelling result can be obtained
if the consumer cannot search for quality. In this case, the label is the only
credible source to signal quality. Even though the label does not offer full
revelation, firms of high and medium quality products still have the incentive
to separate themselves from the worst.
Proposition 2.2. If the consumer is for sure a niche type, namely, if ω is
equal to 1, then there exists an equilibrium where all types except the l type
firm adopt the label.
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If consumers do not value product attributes differently, the unravelling
results are still obtained. The intuition is similar to that in Proposition
2.1. In this case, products are differentiated vertically. Since it is a dominant
strategy for type h firm to disclose, typemα’s best response is also to disclose,
which in turn induces mβ to disclose as well.
2.4.2 Voluntary Label Adoption
We now establish the equilibrium which explains low label adoption rates.
As this equilibrium only exists when label adoption is voluntary, we call this
equilibrium the "voluntary equilibrium" hereafter. Proposition 2.3 summa-
rizes the voluntary equilibrium:
Proposition 2.3. If λ ≥ 11−c , c <
λ






exists a PBE where
• the firm adopts the label if and only if it is of type h or mβ,
• the mass consumer never searches,
• the niche consumer searches only when the product does not have a label





• the type-dependent prices pθ are deterministic for θ ∈ {h, α, β}. pl is





We now illustrate the intuition of Proposition 2.3 and describe all equi-
librium strategies in detail. First, we solve for the equilibrium strategies by
backward induction. At the consumption stage, the consumer’s strategy is
simple. Since the consumer is rational, she purchases if the expected utility
she can derive from this product is at least as high as the product price.
Next, in the search stage, since the consumer’s utility gain is type-dependent,
benefits from search differs for the two consumer types. For both types of
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consumer, if the label is present, beliefs about product attributes are deter-
ministic in this equilibrium. If the signal is 2, then the product is (A,B). If
the signal is 1, the product must be (a,B). Moreover, since only the l type
firm sets price at u0 with positive probability, if the price is equal to u0, then
the consumer knows that the product must be (a, b). Therefore, in all of the
above cases, regardless of her type, the consumer does not have an incentive
to search.
When the price is pα and there is no label, the consumer forms the belief
that the product is (A, b) with probability 11+σ , and (a, b) with probability
σ
1+σ , where σ is the probability that the l type firm prices at pα. For the
mass consumer, both products yield the utility level of u0, which leaves her
no incentive to search. For the niche consumer, (A,b) is worth λ more than
(a,b), which only provides the base utility u0. Hence, the niche consumer
searches if
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0 − pα)− c ≥
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0 + σu0)− pα. (2.1)
As we will see in the following analysis, in equilibrium, the niche consumer
is indifferent between search and no search. It is therefore a best response if
the niche consumer searches with probability γ = ωpα−u0
ωpα
. To summarize the
search strategies of the consumer, the mass consumer never searches, and the
niche consumer only searches with positive probability if the price is pα and
no FoP label is available.
Next, we solve for the optimal pricing and signalling strategies of the firm.
In period 2, the optimal pricing strategy in this equilibrium is as follows:
First, if the firm is a high type, its attribute qualities are fully communicated
through the label. In the range of parameter specified, the high type firm will
set the price equal to the willingness to pay of the niche consumer. This is
due to the fact that the niche attribute generates sufficiently high utility, or
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equivalently, the probability that the consumer is of niche type is sufficiently
high. Therefore, the high type firm sets the price at ph = λ + 1 + u0. The
pricing strategy for the mβ type firm is straight-forward. In this equilibrium,
mβ also fully reveals its type. Since the consumer values its product at 1+u0
regardless of her type, mβ type firm sets the price at pβ = 1 + u0.
As for the pricing strategies of types who do not adopt the label, the mα
type firm is pooled with the l type firm. It is a best response for the l type
to randomize between u0 and pα, the price that the mα type firm sets. In
this equilibrium, both pricesu0 and pα yield the same expected profit for the
l type firm because the niche consumer randomizes her search strategy.
The profit maximizing pricing strategy for the mα type firm can be ob-
tained by solving the following equations:
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0 − pα)− c =
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0 + σu0)− pα = 0
Since the mα type firm cannot prevent the l type firm from mimicking, it has
to set a price which makes the niche consumer indifferent between buying
without search and searching, while leaving the niche consumer as well-off as











We provide only the intuition of incentive compatibility here and defer the
full examination to the appendix. An off-equilibrium belief which survives D1-
criterion is where the consumer assigns probability 1 to any off-equilibrium
signal bundle of price and institutional signal. With such off-equilibrium
beliefs, it is straightforward to see that the h and l types do not deviate.
Both type h and l earn the monopolist profit for the value of their products.
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Type l cannot mimic any type other than mα in equilibrium, for all other
types have verifiable signals through the label.
Considering the incentives of the mα type firm, note that in the range of
parameters we specify in Proposition 2.3, the probability that the consumer is
of niche type is sufficiently high, or equivalently, the niche attribute generates
sufficiently high utility. Therefore, firm mα can set a sufficiently high price
such that expected profit ωpα, the probability of the consumer being niche
type times the price it sets, is higher than the profit of firm mβ. In such a
case, firm mα has no incentive to deviate and adopt the label.
The mβ type firm has no incentive to deviate and mimic the mα type
firm either. Note that in equilibrium, the consumer randomizes search with
a probability such that the l type firm is indifferent between setting price at
u0 and pα. Therefore, if firm mβ does not adopt the label and sets the price
at pα, the expected profit will be exactly u0, since the niche consumer will
not purchase (a,B) at price pα. Clearly, this profit is lower than the mβ type
firm’s equilibrium profit level 1 + u0.
In the voluntary equilibrium, the classic unravelling result is not obtained.
The key to this result is that the label is not the only source of information.
If the consumer is willing to incur the search cost, she can learn more about
the attribute qualities. In such a case, if consumers have heterogeneous pref-
erences, firms have an incentive to target the consumers who value their
products more. One way to achieve targeting is to avoid the label and induce
the targeted consumers to conduct search so that they find these products.
By doing so, these firms earn a higher profit than they would if they adopt
the label, but the consumer has to bear the search cost.
2.4.3 Mandatory Label Adoption
One intuitive solution for the low label adoption rate is to make the label
mandatory. In this section, we first characterize the unique equilibrium in
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the same parameter range as in the voluntary equilibrium. We then show
in the next section that if the label adoption policy is the only thing that
changes and consumers still have other information sources, then making the
label mandatory may decrease welfare. Proposition 2.4 presents the only
equilibrium ("mandatory equilibrium" hereafter) which survives D1-criterion
refinement when label adoption is mandatory in the parameter range of the
voluntary equilibrium.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that label adoption is mandatory. If λ ≥ λ̄M =
u20+6u0−4c+8
4−4c+2u0 , c <
λ−1







, there exists a
PBE where
• the type-dependent prices pθ are deterministic for θ ∈ {h,mα, l},
• the mβ type firm randomizes the price between pMα , the price that type





• the mass consumer never searches





We show in the appendix that an equilibrium where the mα and mβ
type firms pool on pricing strategy does not survive D1-criterion refinement.
Moreover, for the parameter range where the voluntary equilibrium exists,
only a semi-separating equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.4 exists.
We now discuss the incentives of the firm. When label adoption is manda-
tory, the high and low types are fully revealed to the consumer. The pricing
strategies for these two types are therefore straight-forward. As in the vol-
untary equilibrium, the price that the high type firm sets pMh is equal to the
niche consumer’s willingness to pay, λ + 1 + u0. The low type firm sets the
price pMl at the base utility u0.
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When the probability that the consumer is a niche type ω is sufficiently
high, or equivalently, when λ is sufficiently high, the mβ type has an incentive
to mimic the mα type. The construction of the mandatory equilibrium is
similar to that of the voluntary equilibrium. It is incentive compatible for the
mα type firm to set a price where the niche consumer is indifferent between
purchasing without search, searching and leaving the market. The mβ type
firm randomizes between this price pMα and 1 + u0, the willingness to pay of
the consumer for its product.
In terms of the consumer’s optimal strategies, it is easy to see that the
consumer does not search if the label signal s is 2 or 0. In these cases,
information on product attributes is fully conveyed. On the other hand,
uncertainty may still persist if the label signal s yields 1. If the listed price
is 1 + u0, both the niche and mass type consumers purchase without search,
since the product attributes are clearly (a,B). The optimal search behaviors
of the niche and mass consumers differ, however, when the label signal s = 1
and the price is pMα . Since pMα is greater than 1+u0, the mass consumer leaves
the market. The niche consumer, as described in the firms’ optimal pricing
strategy above, is indifferent between searching and buying without search.
Therefore, it is a best response for the niche consumer to randomize search
at a rate such that the mβ type firm earns equal profits between prices pMα
and 1 + u0.
2.4.4 Mandatory vs. Voluntary Adoption
In this section, we compare the mandatory and voluntary equilibria. For the
sake of clarity, all strategies played in the mandatory equilibrium are denoted
with an upper script M . For example, the price that the mα firm sets in the
mandatory equilibrium is denoted as pMmα .
Lemma 2.1. When label adoption is mandatory, the mα type firm is mim-
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icked more frequently. In other words, σMα > σα.
Proof: see appendix.
Corollary 2.1. The mα type firm sets a lower price in the mandatory equi-
librium than in the voluntary equilibrium. In other words, pMα < pα.
Proof: see appendix.
From Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.1, we can derive Proposition 2.5.
Proposition 2.5. Given signals that indicate the firm may be of mα type,
the consumer searches less in the mandatory equilibrium. Namely, γM < γ.
However, the ex ante probability of consumer search is higher in the manda-
tory equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 2.5 establishes our first inefficiency result in the mandatory
equilibrium. It may be intuitive to postulate that consumers incur less search
costs when label adoption is mandatory. However, in the case where con-
sumers have heterogeneous preferences and the simplified label cannot fully
separate all products, enforcing mandatory label adoption results in con-
sumers searching more frequently. The drive of this result, as we show in
Lemma 2.1, is that prices provide a weaker signal. In our model, when label
adoption is mandatory, the mβ type firm mimicks the mα type firm more
frequently than the l type firm does so in the voluntary equilibrium. Indeed,
given that the label already signals one high quality attribute, the consumer
does not have to conduct search as frequently. However, since label adoption
is mandatory, the niche consumer encounters the signals which induces search
more frequently. In reality, this maps to the case where many products have
a mediocre label and similar prices. Consumers who value certain qualities
will spend a higher cost searching.
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Proposition 2.6. Welfare is lower in the mandatory equilibrium than in the
voluntary equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 2.6 presents our main result in this section. As we show in the
voluntary equilibrium, it is true that if consumers have heterogeneous prefer-
ences and other sources of information, label adoption may not be appealing
to some firms. Such reaction sabotages the well-meaning introduction of the
label. If very few firms adopt the label, then consumers still don’t have addi-
tional information about most products. However, forcing firms to adopt the
label does not necessarily improve efficiency. As we show in the appendix,
when label adoption becomes mandatory, the probability of trade taking place
decreases. Note that the mα firm sets a lower price to compensate for the
niche consumer’s search cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, the lowered price pMα
does not increase efficiency. Since the mβ type firm mimicks the mα type firm
at a higher frequency, the likelihood that the niche consumer purchases after
search is lower. In other words, the niche consumer is more likely to leave
the market after search in the mandatory equilibrium than in the voluntary
equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion
In marketplaces today, consumers often face the problem of having too much
information to process. It is therefore important to present information in
a comprehensive way. Front-of-Package labels is one example to help con-
sumers better understand nutrition contents of grocery products. In contrast
to the nutrition facts table on the back of the package, front-of-package la-
bels are shown at the front so that consumers can easily see them and make
comparisons between products. Moreover, for readability, Front-of-Package
labels are often a simple sign or a one-dimensional traffic light. A trade-off
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between informativeness and interpretability emerges. The labels are imme-
diately readable, but some information is inevitably lost in the process of
simplification.
In this paper, we construct a signalling game to discuss simplified signals
such as Front-of-Package labels. First, we provide an explanation to an em-
pirical puzzle: why label adoption rates are low. In our setting, all players
in the game are rational. We show that low adoption rates result from con-
sumers’ heterogeneous preferences and existing information sources available
to consumers. If consumers have homogeneous preferences, or if the label
is the only information available to consumers, firms will have an incentive
to adopt the label. However, since these conditions often do not hold, low
adoption rates of FoP labels may occur. Some firms may avoid labels in order
to induce their targeted consumers to search for them.
Second, we discuss adoption regulations for Front-of-Package labels. We
show that making adoption mandatory may be welfare-decreasing. Manda-
tory adoption not only changes the label of the products, but also their prices.
Specifically, mandatory adoption results in firms setting a similar price to
other products in their tier. Consumers who value certain product attributes
will have to search among a potentially larger pool. If search is costly for the
consumer, which is the case if Front-of-Package labels can be helpful, then
making it mandatory for firms to adopt these labels may in fact create more
search cost on the consumer side.
Our paper is the first attempt to our knowledge offering a theoretical ex-
planation for why label adoption rates are low, and how mandating the label
may not be the solution, but much more can be explored in future research.
There are many more potential contributing factors to low adoption rate.
Consumers may exhibit behavioral biases which allow firms to profit without
adopting the label. Moreover, in our model, a firm produces only one prod-
uct. In reality, a firm may product multiple products with different nutrition
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contents, which can change their incentives to unravel. Empirical research
can help to identify the main causes of low FoP adoption rates. Finally, when
it comes to Front-of-Package labels, although effects of nutrition improvement
of products are often expected, few consider other equilibrium effects such as
pricing, signalling and label adoption. Future research applying knowledge
in industrial organization, mechanism design and behavioral economics is in
need to bridge these gaps.
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Chapter 3





This chapter is about a general class of bargaining games in which there is
private information about the amount that is being bargained over (often
called the “pie size”). This class is most common in everyday bargaining. It
is also interesting in both theory and practice.
Theory is interesting because when there is private information and people
are self-interested, theories based on individual rationality typically predict
an inevitable loss of efficiency. That is, even when a bargain is mutually
beneficial for both sides, they will not always come to agreement.
Private information bargaining is interesting in practice because, while
1This chapter is based on the joint work with Colin Camerer, Po-Hsuan Lin, Gideon Nave,
Alec Smith and Joseph Tao-Yi Wang.
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inefficiencies are predicted by theory, it is also known that if there are observ-
able statistical proxies for the hidden private information, then sets of rules
(mechanisms) which use this information can improve efficiency [McAfee and
Reny, 1992, Crémer and McLean, 1985, 1988]. Therefore, it is possible that
methods for measuring private information can improve efficiency, even when
bargainers voluntarily participate in systems using those measures.
There is a long history of using highly controlled laboratory experiments
to study bargaining. A brief description of this history helps explain why we
are enthusiastic about modern applications of machine learning.
3.1.1 A Brief History of Bargaining Experiments
The experimental literature on bargaining is vast, so we focus only on those
studies closely related to ours.2 Before theoretical breakthroughs in under-
standing structured bargaining, most experiments used unstructured commu-
nication. The main focus of interest was process-free solution concepts such
as the Nash bargaining solution [Nash Jr, 1950], and important extensions to
those concepts [e.g. Kalai et al., 1975].
We will refer to the amount of surplus available to share as the “pie”.
Many bargains [Nydegger and Owen, 1974, Roth and Malouf, 1979] led to
an equal split of the pie. Roth suggested that “bargainers sought to identify
initial bargaining positions that had some special reasons for being credible...
that served as focal points that then influenced the subsequent conduct of
negotiation” [Roth, 1985]. Under informational asymmetries, disagreements
may arise due to coordination difficulties. Several papers by Roth and col-
leagues then explored what happens when players bargain over points which
have different financial value to players [Roth and Malouf, 1979, Roth et al.,
1981, Roth and Murnighan, 1982, Roth, 1985]. In theory, there should be no
2For longer reviews, see Kennan and Wilson [1993], Ausubel et al. [2002], Thompson et al.
[2010]
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disagreements in these games but a modest percentage of trials (10-20%) did
result in disagreement, which seems to involve differences about which “focal
points” are acceptable.3 Roth et al. [1988] also drew attention to the fact that
the large majority of agreements are made just before a (known) deadline, an
observation called the “deadline effect”.
Two pioneering papers, Ståhl [1972] and Rubinstein [1982] showed how
noncooperative game theory might be used to improve the apparent preci-
sion of bargaining theories. Since then, almost all experimental studies have
tested what happens in highly structured settings using variants of those early
game structures; for a review see Ausubel et al. [2002]. In these theories and
experiments, “structure” means that the rules of how bargaining proceeds are
clearly specified in the theory; put differently, bargainers have no freedom to
time their offers or use natural language. The rules typically define when
bargaining must be completed (either a deadline or an infinite horizon), who
can offer or counteroffer and at what time, when offers are accepted, whether
communication is allowed (and in what form), and so on.
Theoretical predictions of outcomes and payoffs depend sensitively on
these structural features.4 That structural-sensitivity proved to be enticing,
because it created a cornucopia of interesting experiments testing whether
bargaining was sensitive to structured features as theory predicted. This led
to a burst of progress in experimental literature testing these theories.5
Many other experiments have observed what happens in semi-structured
bargaining in which there is two-sided private information [Valley et al., 2002].
3See Schelling [1960], Roth [1985], Kristensen and Gärling [1997], Janssen [2001], Binmore
and Samuelson [2006], Janssen [2006], Bardsley et al. [2009], Isoni et al. [2014, 2013],
Hargreaves Heap et al. [2014].
4See Cramton [1984], Chaussees [1985], Rubinstein [1985], Grossman and Perry [1986], Gul
and Sonnenschein [1988], Ausubel and Deneckere [1993].
5See Ochs and Roth [1989], Camerer et al. [1993], Mitzkewitz and Nagel [1993], Güth et al.
[1996], Kagel et al. [1996], Güth and Van Damme [1998], Rapoport et al. [1998], Kagel
and Wolfe [2001], Srivastava [2001], Croson et al. [2003], Johnson et al. [2002], Kriss et al.
[2013].
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The term “semi-structured” means that there is structure about bargainers’
valuations and beliefs, but players may make offers at any time, and offers can
be accompanied by natural language. The typical finding is that in face-to-
face and unstructured communication via message-passing, there are fewer
disagreements than predicted by theory. (A comparable finding in sender-
receiver games is that senders willingly share more private information than
is selfishly rational; see Crawford [2003], Cai and Wang [2006], Wang et al.
[2010a].) However, in the highly structured case in which the bargainers can
only make a single offer and no natural language is allowed, disagreements
are more common, and the key predictions of theory hold surprisingly well
[Radner and Schotter, 1989, Rapoport et al., 1995, Rapoport and Fuller, 1995,
Daniel et al., 1998].
Since the rise of structured bargaining theories, experimentation in eco-
nomics on unstructured bargaining has all but disappeared. Our paper re-
turns to this less popular route, exploring unstructured bargaining with one-
sided private information in an experiment.
There are three good reasons to revive the study of unstructured bargain-
ing now.
First, most natural two-player bargaining is not highly structured. Con-
ventional methods for conducting bargaining do emerge in natural settings,
but these methods are rarely constrained because there are no penalties for
deviating from conventions. Studying unstructured bargaining is of particu-
lar importance, as strategic behavior may substantially differ between static
and dynamic environments that allow continuous-time interaction [Friedman
and Oprea, 2012]. There may also be clear empirical regularities in unstruc-
tured bargaining—such as deadline effects [Roth et al., 1988, Gächter and
Riedl, 2005]—that are evident in the data but not predicted by most theories
(though see [Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2013]). Establishing these regularities can
lead theorizing, rather than test theory.
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Second, even when bargaining is unstructured, theory can still be applied
to make clear, interesting predictions. A natural intuition is that when bar-
gaining methods are unstructured, no clear predictions can be made, as if the
lack of structure in the bargaining protocol must imply a lack of structure
(or precision) in predictions. This intuition is just not right. In the case we
study, clear predictions about unstructured bargaining do emerge, thanks to
the wonderful “revelation principle” [Myerson, 1979, 1984]. This principle
has the useful property of implying empirical predictions for non-cooperative
equilibria, independently of the bargaining protocol, based purely on the in-
formation structure. For example, the application of the revelation principle
in our setting leads to the prediction that strikes will become less common
as the amount of surplus the players are bargaining over grows. This type
of prediction is non-obvious and can be easily tested. Furthermore, if addi-
tional assumptions are made about equilibrium offers, and combined with the
revelation principle, then exact numerical predictions about offers and strike
rates can be made. That is, even if the bargaining protocol lacks structure,
predictions can have plenty of restricted “structure” thanks to the beautiful
game theory.
Third, unstructured bargaining creates a large amount of interesting data
during the bargaining process. Players can make offers at any time, retract
offers, and so on. Natural language can be analyzed, perhaps including vocal
properties in verbal communication. Self-reported and biological measures
of emotion, cognitive effort, visual attention to display elements, and even
neural activity can also be gathered.
Our view is that theoretical and experimental economists regarded these
types of data as a nuisance—a “bug” in an experimental design rather than
a “feature.” Such data seem like a nuisance if one does not have a theory to
say anything about them. However, if process variables are systematically
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associated with outcomes, these empirical regularities both challenge simple
equilibrium theories and invite new theory development.
To this end, we use a very limited type of process data in a new way:
To predict which bargaining trials will results in deals and strikes. We use
a penalized regression approach from machine learning, to select predictive
features from a large number of process features. Over-fitting is controlled by
making out of sample, cross-validated predictions. We find that a machine-
learned predictive model based only on process features can predict strikes
about as accurately as the pie sizes can. Adding both process and pie size
together makes even better predictions.
Process data are also useful because practical negotiation advice often con-
sists of simple heuristics about how to bargain well [Pruitt, 2013]. For exam-
ple, negotiation researchers have long ago postulated that initial offers might
serve as bargaining anchors and that various psychological manipulations,
such as perspective taking, could potentially bias bargaining outcomes.6 Ad-
vice like this can be easily tested by carefully controlled experimental designs
that allow unstructured bargaining while keeping the process fully tractable,
such as our paradigm.
The closest precursor to our design is Forsythe, Kennan, and Sopher
(henceforth FKS), who studied unstructured bargaining with one-sided pri-
vate information about the sizes of two possible pies [Forsythe et al., 1991b].
They used mechanism design to identify properties shared by all Bayesian
equilibria of any bargaining game, using the revelation principle [Myerson,
1979, 1984]. This approach gives a “strike condition” predicting when dis-
agreements would be ex-ante efficient. They tested their theory by conducting
several experimental treatments, with free-form communication. The results
qualitatively match the theory. We generalize their earlier model to capture
6See Kristensen and Gärling [1997], Galinsky and Mussweiler [2001], Van Poucke and Bue-
lens [2002], Mason et al. [2013], Ames and Mason [2015].
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any finite number of pie sizes. Because there are several different pie sizes,
equilibria which maximize efficiency or equality create different predictions,
which we test. Our experimental design uses 6 pie sizes with rapid bargain-
ing (10 seconds per trial), where bargaining occurs only through visible offers
and counter-offers, with no other restrictions. They also did not analyze their
process data at all, whereas we use machine learning analysis of the process
features to predict strikes on a trial-by-trial basis.
Another branch of literature that is related to our study is the experimen-
tal work investigating how humans resolve trade-offs between equality and
efficiency. While this question is still under a (heated) debate7, it is largely
accepted that people are heterogeneous with respect to how they prioritize
these factors.8
A few recent papers have investigated highly structured strategic inter-
actions [De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008, Blanco et al., 2011, López-Pérez et al.,
2015, Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn, 2014], and some have examined free form
bargaining with full information [Herreiner and Puppe, 2004, Galeotti et al.,
2018]. We extend this literature by deriving theoretical predictions and test
empirically how humans resolve the equality-efficiency trade-off in a dynamic
strategic environment with informational asymmetry.
Finally, our study closely relates to negotiation research [Pruitt, 2013],
a branch of social psychology and organizational behavior research. In con-
trast to economic theories that typically describe behavior in equilibrium (i.e.,
when players best respond to each other’s actions), negotiation theories as-
sume that bargainers are not in equilibrium and focus on prescriptive models,
in which adopting certain strategies improves negotiation outcomes. Nego-
7See Kritikos and Bolle [2001], Charness and Rabin [2002], Engelmann and Strobel [2004,
2006], Fehr et al. [2006], Bolton and Ockenfels [2006], Durante et al. [2014], El Harbi et al.
[2015].
8For example, economics students are inclined to favor efficiency over equality, females
are more egalitarian than males, and political preferences do not seem to have an effect
[Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, Fehr et al., 2006].
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tiation researchers take into account the process of bargaining by studying
psychological constructs such as aspirations, defined as “the highest valued
outcome at which the negotiator places a non-negligible likelihood that that
value would be accepted by the other party” [White and Neale, 1994]. Aspira-
tions play an important role in determining the bargainers’ initial offers, and
were shown to influence bargaining outcome variables such as disagreement
rates and surplus division.9
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2.1, we use
mechanism design theory to derive general qualitative properties of bargaining
in equilibrium. We show that in our setting, no equilibrium satisfies both
equality and efficiency in all states of the world, and propose two equilibria
that solve this trade-off by either favoring the former or the latter. We present
a novel experimental design in section 3.2.2, and summarize its general results
in section 3.3.1. We use machine learning to examine how bargaining process
data can be associated with bargaining outcome variables in section 3.3.2,
and conclude in section 3.4.
3.2 Theory and Experiments
In this paper, we adopt the theoretical framework from Camerer et al. [2019]
who extend the two state model developed in Kennan and Wilson [1990] and
Forsythe et al. [1991b] to an arbitrary finite number of states. This extension
yields comparative statics predictions regarding the frequency of disagree-
ments in each state with only the game structure, incentive compatibility
(IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints. However, the mechanism
design approach only characterizes the class of possible equilibria rather than
predicts specific outcomes. Thus, Camerer et al. [2019] further take advan-
9See Yukl [1974], White and Neale [1994], White et al. [1994], Kristensen and Gärling
[1997], Galinsky and Mussweiler [2001], Van Poucke and Buelens [2002], Buelens and
Van Poucke [2004], Mason et al. [2013], Ames and Mason [2015].
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tage of the focal points in this game to obtain testable predictions about both
deal rates and payoffs in each state. In this section, we first introduce the
theoretical framework and then the experiments.
3.2.1 Theoretical Framework
In this unstructured bargaining game, two players bargain over an economic
surplus or “pie,” which is a random variable denoted by π. The finite set
of true states indexed by k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, and the pie amount in state k
is πk. Without loss of generality, we assume πk > πj when k > j. The
informed player knows the true pie amount. The uninformed player does
not know the pie amount, but knows the informed player knows it. The
probability distribution over pie sizes Pr(πk) = pk is common knowledge.
The players bargain over the payoff of the uninformed player, denoted by w,
by continuously communicating their bids within a certain amount of time
T—which is also a common knowledge. If the players agree on a payoff for
the uninformed player w, then the informed player gets the rest of the pie
π−w. If they do not agree on an allocation before the deadline, both players
get nothing and we refer to this outcome as a disagreement, or in keeping
with the motivation of Forsythe et al. [1991b], as a strike, while successful
bargaining outcomes are deals.
From a mechanism design perspective, we can view this bargaining game
as a process of transmitting the private information about the pie size from the
informed player to the uninformed player. By the revelation principle (My-
erson [1979, 1984]), we know that every Nash equilibrium in this bargaining
game can be implemented in an incentive compatible direct mechanism where
the informed player truthfully reports the actual state to a neutral mediator
and the player’s payoffs are equal to their payoffs in the original bargaining
game.
Following Forsythe et al. [1991b] and Camerer et al. [2019], in the direct
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mechanism the informed player announces that the state is j ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Given the announcement, the neutral mediator determines the deal proba-
bility (γj) and the payoff to the the uninformed player (xj). The informed
player gets the rest of the pie (γjπk − xj). Thus a mechanism involves 2K
parameters, {γk, xk}Kk=1.
A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if it is optimal for players to
reveal their private information. In our setting, this means that the informed
player’s expected payoff must be (weakly) maximized in the direct mechanism
when she announces the true size of the pie. This requires
γkπk − xk ≥ γjπk − xj, ∀k and ∀j 6= k. (IC)
An IC-mechanism is individually rational (IR) when both players prefer
to participate in it. Assuming the players’ payoffs from not participating are
zero, this means that for every state k the expected payoff to each player is
positive, so that
γkπk − xk ≥ 0, (IR-1)
xk ≥ 0. (IR-2)
Based on the IC, IR-1, IR-2 and conditions, Camerer et al. [2019] prove
the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. If the bargaining mechanism satisfies the IC, IR-1, and IR-2
conditions, then:
1. Deal rates are monotonically increasing in the pie size xk.
2. The uninformed player’s payoffs are monotonically increasing in the pie
size.
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3. The uninformed player’s payoff is identical for all states in which the
deal probability is 1.
Note that the payoff of the uniformed player xk in the direct mechanism
is equivalent to the expected payoff of the uninformed player in state k of
the bargaining game: xk = γkwk, where wk is the uninformed player’s payoff
conditional on a deal being made in state k.
The direct mechanism is interim-efficient [Holmström and Myerson, 1983]
if the payoff profile is Pareto-optimal for the set of K+1 agents: the informed
player in each of the K possible states of the world and the uninformed player
(in expectation). Interim efficiency implies the following strike condition:
Lemma 3.2. For any mechanism that satisfies the IR-1, IR-2 and IC condi-










For the proof, see Camerer et al. [2019].
The IC, IR-1, IR-2, and strike conditions limit the scope of possible bar-
gaining outcomes and predict when strikes are likely to occur. However, they
are not sufficient to pin down the strike rates 1 − γk and the equilibrium
payoffs wk in each state. To make a more precise prediction, Camerer et al.
[2019] use an equilibrium selection approach which assumes that equal payoff
splits are natural focal points. In the experiments, the possible states, π,
takes on values that are the integer dollar amounts between $1 and $6 with
equal probability. Therefore, we can restrict the state space to {$1, . . . , 6}.
The importance of focal points has been well-studied in the literature
(Schelling [1960], Roth [1985], Kristensen and Gärling [1997], Janssen [2001],
Binmore and Samuelson [2006], Janssen [2006], Bardsley et al. [2009], Isoni
et al. [2013, 2014]). Absent other salient features of bargaining, the natural
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focal point is an equal split (i.e., wk = πk2 ). Indeed, equal splits often emerge
in bargaining experiments (e.g. Lin et al. [2018]). Based on players’ tendency
to coordinate on the equal-split allocation, Camerer et al. [2019] propose that
the equilibrium payoff of the uninformed player, conditional on a deal, will
equal half of the pie size (wk = πk2 ) as long as an equal split satisfies the IR
and IC conditions (Lemma 3.1), and subjects to efficiency conditions. By
either prioritizing the former or the latter, Camerer et al. [2019] derive two
competing equilibrium predictions, which are the efficient equilibrium and
the equal split equilibrium.
The Efficient Equilibrium
The IC conditions and Lemma 3.1 show that if there exists a cutoff state πc
where the deal rate γc is equal to 1, then strikes are inefficient in all states
πk such that k ≥ c. Lemma 3.1 also predicts that the uninformed player’s
payoff must be the same in all states where no disagreements occur.
The efficient equilibrium prioritizes efficiency over equality. In this equilib-
rium, the deal rate is assumed to be 1 whenever the strike condition (Lemma
3.2) does not hold. To obtain a precise prediction about the equilibrium unin-
formed payoffs w∗k, we assume that players divide the pie equally in lower-value




2 , ∀πk ≤ πc,
πc
2 , ∀πk > πc.
In our experiment, π is an integer dollar between 1 and 6 with equal
likelihood. It follows numerically that the strike condition (Lemma 3.2) holds
for pies of size 1 and 2. When π = 3, the two sides of the inequality are equal,
so the strike rate is indeterminate. When π ≥ 4, there should be no strikes.
Therefore, we can first pin down that the deal rates in large pies would satisfy
γ4 = γ5 = γ6 = 1. Furthermore, as we plug w∗k into the IC constraint, we
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can obtain the following predictions regarding payoffs and deal rates in the
efficient equilibrium:





2 , 2, 2, 2
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5 , 1, 1, 1
)
.
The Equal Split Equilibrium
On the other hand, some efficiency must be sacrificed in order to achieve
equality for each pie size. In the equal split equilibrium, we first assume that






Because deal rates are increasing with the pie size and the uninformed
player’s payoff must be identical in all states where there are no strikes
(Lemma 3.1), full equality implies that efficiency (i.e., no strikes) can only be
achieved in the largest pie. Thus, to pin down exact numerical predictions of
deal rates in the equal split equilibrium, we set γ6 = 1. Inserting w∗∗k = πk2
into the IC constraint, we derive the predicted payoffs and deal rates in the
equal split equilibrium:
























Thus the two types of equilibria imply different predictions regarding pay-
offs and deal rates.
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3.2.2 Experiments
Camerer et al. [2019] developed a novel experimental paradigm of dynamic
bargaining that allows both parties to communicate offers whenever they
please, while keeping their behavior tractable. This experiment was first
conducted by Camerer et al. [2019] (Experiment 1), which is the baseline
treatment. We also report results from a follow-up experiment with same
design but with different treatments (Experiment 2). In this section, we first
introduce the experimental design and then the treatments.
Design
The experimental design is a continuous-time bargaining game with one-sided
private information. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are assigned
to one of the two roles: the informed player or the uninformed player. Players’
roles are fixed for the session’s 120 bargaining rounds.
In each round, each informed player is randomly matched with an unin-
formed player to bargain over a pie with a size unknown to the uninformed
player. The pie size is an integer from 1 to 6, i.e. π ∈ {$1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and
drawn from a commonly known discrete uniform distribution. The informed
player would know the pie size for that round after the draw is made.
Each pair bargained over the uninformed player’s payoff, denoted by w.
Both players communicate their offers, in multiples of $0.110, using a mouse
click on a graphic interface which was programmed with z-Tree software (Fis-
chbacher [2007]). During the first two seconds, both players can decide their
initial bargaining position without seeing the opponent’s position (Figure
3.1A). The initial cursor location is randomized.
10In Camerer et al. [2019] (Experiment 1), they set the resolution to be in multiples of
$0.2, which is a compromise between $0.1 (too fine a resolution for coordinating in a
short game) and $0.5 (a resolution that would not allow for testing the use of focal
points, as every possible offer would be a half of an integer pie). However, the result in
Experiment 1 shows that players are able to coordinate in such a short period, so we
increase the resolution to be in multiples of $0.1 in Experiment 2.
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After initial locations are set, the players start a 10-second bargaining
round. They communicate the offers with mouse clicks (Figure 3.1B). As
both players’ positions match, a green vertical stripe would appear on the
screen (Figure 3.1C), and this position would become the final deal if there is
no change on the position in the following 1.5 seconds (or if the period ends,
which ever came first)11. If no deal is reached within 10 seconds, both players
earn nothing. After each round, the players would be notified their payoffs
and the actual pie size (Figure 3.1D).
Figure 3.1: (A) Initial offer screen: in the first two seconds of bargaining,
both players can set their initial positions without revealing to the opponent.
The pie size is on the top left corner and it only appears on informed player’s
screen. (B) Players communicate their offers using mouse click on the inter-
face. (C) When two players’ positions match, the green vertical stripe appears
and this would be the deal if there is no change in the following 1.5 seconds.
(D) After the bargaining round, both players would be notified about their
payoffs and the pie size.
11In Experiment 1, the offers have to match for 1.5 seconds in order to make a deal. In
other words, the latest time where the players’ bids can match is t = 8.5 seconds.
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Experiment 1
Camerer et al. [2019] conduct eight experimental sessions, five in the Social
Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at Caltech and three in the Cali-
fornia Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. In the
beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to isolated com-
puter workstations and are handed printed versions of the instructions (see
Appendix D in Camerer et al. [2019]). The instructions are also read aloud
by the experimenter (who is the same person in all sessions). All of the
participants complete a short quiz to check their understanding of the task.
Subjects play 15 practice rounds to become familiar with the game and the
interactive interface before the actual play of 120 rounds. Participants’ pay-
offs are based on their profits in a randomly chosen 15% of the rounds, plus
a show-up fee of $5. Each session lasts between 70 and 90 minutes (including
check-in, reading of instructions, experimental task, and payment).
Experiment 2
The follow-up experiment is conducted in the Taiwan Social Science Ex-
perimental Laboratory (TASSEL) at National Taiwan University. We con-
duct eight experimental sessions. Three sessions are female-informed sessions
where female subjects take the role of informed players and played against
uninformed male subjects. Another three sessions are male-informed sessions
which have the opposite design to the female-informed sessions. In the female-
informed and male-informed sessions, we require an equal number of male and
female subjects. Subjects are only notified of this requirement when entering
the experiment. In addition, we conduct one experienced session and one
high-stake session in order test whether our results are robust to experience
and stakes. In the experienced session, we recruit subjects who have partici-
pated one of the six previous sessions. In the high-stakes session, we multiply
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the stakes by 5. Notice that there is no gender constraint in the experienced
and high-stake session.
The experimental procedures are the same in Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 2. In Experiment 2, participants’ payoffs are based on their profits in a
randomly chosen 10% of the rounds, plus a show-up fee of NT$ 100. Payoffs
in the experiments are converted into NT$ according to a pre-set exchange
rate (1 ECU = NT$15) specified in the instructions. In the high-stake session,
the exchange rate is 1 ECU = NT$75 while the exchange rate is 1 ECU =
NT$30 in the experienced session.
After 120 rounds of the bargaining game, we measure subjects’ risk pref-
erences and loss aversion by Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimen-
tation (DOSE) developed by Wang et al. [2010b]. In each round, subjects
are asked to choose from 2 lotteries. Lottery 1 is a risky asset, while lottery
2 yields a fixed amount. There are 3 practice rounds and 40 paid rounds.
At the end of the experiment, 12 rounds from the bargaining game and 1
round from DOSE would be drawn and realized. Before undergoing DOSE,
all subjects evaluated their subjective willingness to take risk on a scale from
0 (not willing to take any risk at all) to 10 (willing to take any risk). The
evaluation would not affect the payoff. Each session lasts around 2.5 hours.
3.3 Experimental Results
3.3.1 Basics
In this section, we focus on analyzing the deal rates across different treat-
ments. See Camerer et al. [2019] and Online Appendix for further analysis
on the payoffs and the bargaining dynamics.
Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of average bargaining outcomes
in different treatments. The average bargaining outcomes are similar across
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treatments. Differences in the average payoffs across treatments are less than
$0.1 and differences of average deal rates are within 5%. We high-light some
of our findings in the following: The average surplus loss is the lowest in
the experienced treatment and the highest in the male-informed treatment.
Turning to the information value, which can be interpreted as the advantage
of knowing the pie size, we observe that it is the largest in the experienced
treatment and lowest in the baseline treatment. Bargaining outcomes are
generally robust across different treatments and stakes on the aggregated
level.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Different Treatments
Treatment Baseline Female Male Experienced High-Stake
Informed Payoffa 2.01 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) – –
Uninformed Payoffa 1.49 1.42 1.41 1.40 1.46
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) – –
Deal Rate 0.61 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.65
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) – –
Surplus Lossb 1.13 1.02 1.18 0.96 1.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) – –
Information Valuec 0.40 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.42
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) – –
Means and standard errors (which are shown in parentheses) are calculated by
treating each session’s mean as a single observation. Since there is only one
session for experienced and high-stake treatment, the standard errors for these
two treatments are not computable.
a Averages are calculated for deal games only.
b Surplus loss = the mean expected loss of pie due to strikes.
c Information value = the mean difference between the informed and unin-
formed payoffs.
Next, we break down deal rates according to different pie sizes for different
treatments. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show that in all treatments, deal rates
increase with the pie size. This confirms our theoretical prediction in Lemma
3.1. Moreover, deal rates in female-informed sessions and the experienced
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session are higher than the baseline sessions in all pies (except the largest
pie). On the other hand, deal rates in male-informed sessions and the high-
stake session are higher than the baseline in small pies (π ≤ 3), but lower in















1 2 3 4 5 6
Pie Size
Baseline Female Informed Male Informed
Deal Rate by Pie Size
Figure 3.2: The deal rates under different pie sizes and treatments. The
green bars stand for the average deal rates of baseline sessions at different
pie size. The blue and red bars are for female-informed sessions and male-
informed sessions, respectively. The standard errors (overlaid on the bars)
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Deal Rate by Pie Size
Figure 3.3: The deal rates under different pie sizes and treatments. The green
bars stand for the average deal rates of baseline sessions at different pie size.
The blue and red bars are for the experienced sessions and high-stake sessions,
respectively. The standard errors (overlaid on the bars) are calculated at the
session level. Since there is only one session for experienced and high-stake
treatment, the standard errors are not computable for these two treatments.
We defer further results from Experiment 2 to the Appendix. These results
include analyses of the bargaining dynamics (see Online Appendix C.1) and
testing predictions in Lemma 3.1 (see Online Appendix C.2). In general, the
results in Camerer et al. [2019] are replicated by Experiment 2. Besides the
monotone increase of deal rates and payoffs, we also observe that the equal-
split allocation is the most salient focal point. Regarding the dynamics, we
observe that the informed players’ offers increase, and the uninformed players’
demands decrease with time (within a trial). There is also a strong deadline
effect—most of the deals are reached close to the deadline. Lastly, we analyze
the differences in equilibrium selections using regression.
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3.3.2 Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning
The unstructured paradigm established by Camerer et al. [2019] records, in
addition to initial demands and offers, a large amount of bargaining process
data that may be used to predict disagreements before the deadline. For in-
stance, suppose that at the five-second mark, neither player has changed her
offer for more than three seconds. This mutual stubbornness might be asso-
ciated with an eventual strike. We consider a large number of such candidate
observable features in search of a small set that is predictive, using cross-
validation (Stone [1974]) to control for over-fitting. This machine learning
approach has been used in many applications in computer science and neu-
roscience, and starts to be more widely adopted in economics (e.g. Krajbich
et al. [2009]) and other social sciences (e.g. Dzyabura and Hauser [2011]).
In this paper, we treat Experiment 2 as the lockbox test for the predictive
model built in Camerer et al. [2019]. Therefore, in this section we report
the results from directly feeding the data from Experiment 2 into the model.
First of all, we briefly introduce the algorithm here. We follow Camerer
et al. [2019] to choose 35 behavioral features recorded during bargaining.
Examples of features are the current difference between the offer and demand,
the time since the last position change, and an indicator denoting which
player had changed his or her position in the game first. The full list of
features is presented in Camerer et al. [2019]. For each of the eight sessions
in Experiment 2, we trained a model to classify trials into disagreements
or deals using the data of the remaining seven sessions. The classification
is done by estimating a logistic regression with a least absolute shrinkage
and selection operator (LASSO) penalty (Tibshirani [1996]). By applying
these trained models, we then made out-of-sample predictions of the binary
bargaining outcomes for each of the experimental session.
To assess the predictive power of process data, we estimate three strike
prediction models at eight different points in the bargaining process, separated
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by one-second intervals (i.e., 1, 2, . . . , 8 seconds after bargaining starts). The
first model relies only on the pie size, the second uses only process features
and the third uses both pie size and process features. For each time stamp,
predictions are carried out using the following nested cross-validation proce-
dure: For each of the eight sessions, we train a linear model with the seven
other sessions to predict the outcome (a deal or a strike) by fitting a logistic
LASSO regression. The tuning parameter, λ, is optimized via ten-fold cross-
validation, performed within each training set. Finally, using that trained
model, we conduct out-of-sample predictions for the holdout sessions.
To compare the three models, we use the “receiver operating character-
istic” (ROC) curves (Hanley and McNeil [1982], Bradley [1997]), a standard
tool in signal detection theory which quantifies the performance of a binary
classifier under different trade-offs between type I and type II errors. For a
random classifier, the true positive and false positive rates are identical (the
45-degree line in Figure 3.4). A good classifier increases the true positive rate
(moving up on the y axis) and decreases the false positive rate (moving left
on the x axis). The difference between the ROC and the 45-degree line, in
the upper-left direction, also known as the “area under the curve” (AUC) is
an index of how well the classifier does.
Figure 3.4 shows the ROC curve at t = 2, 5, 7 seconds for both Experiment
1 and 2. The ROC analysis indicates that process data do better than random
for every time stamp in both experiments. Moreover, the fitness of models
with process data increase with time, but the same is not true for the model
with pie size only.
While patterns of AUC are similar in Experiment 1 and 2, there are still
some subtle differences. In Experiment 1, the model with pie and process
features always has the best predictive power and the other two models are
not so distinguishable in later seconds. On the other hand, even though the

















































































































































(C2) Exp 2, t = 7 s
Figure 3.4: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) for predicting disagree-
ments, two, five and seven seconds into the bargaining game. The dashed lines
represent the false and true positive rates of a random classifier. (A1–C1)
show the data from Camerer et al. [2019] (Experiment 1) and (A2–C2) plot
the result from Experiment 2.
predictive power is not significantly stronger than the model with process
features only.
To further investigate which behavioral process features predict strikes,
we follow Camerer et al. [2019] and use a “post-LASSO” procedure proposed
by Belloni et al. [2013, 2012]. Figure 3.6 summarizes the marginal effects
of all process features (z-scored for every time point) in both experiments.
The general feature patterns in Experiment 2 are consistent with those in
Experiment 1.
The current informed player’s offer (positively correlated with a deal) and
the current difference between the players’ bargaining positions (positively
correlated with a strike) are the most predictive process features. One sur-
prising finding in Camerer et al. [2019] is that initial bargaining positions
contain predictive information regarding the chance of reaching a deal, even
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Figure 3.5: Area under the curve (AUC) of disagreements classifiers using
process data, pie size, and the two combined. Note that the classifier’s input
included only trials that were still in progress (when a deal has not yet been
achieved), and excluded trials in which the offers and demand were equal at
the relevant time stamp. The left figure is the original result from Camerer
et al. [2019] (Experiment 1) and the right one is the result from Experiment
2.
Experiment 2, such effect of initial positions is even stronger. We also find
a negative interaction between initial offer and initial demand and a nega-
tive interaction between initial and current offer, which again confirms the
arguments in Camerer et al. [2019].
3.4 Conclusion
Experimentation in economics on bargaining mostly abandoned unstructured
bargaining because there is too little experimental control over all the things
that bargainers can do. Unstructured bargaining seems to hand over the reins
of endogenous “treatments” to the experimental subjects.
If the goal is prediction rather than theory-testing, however, having a
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Figure 3.6: Bargaining Process Features Selected by the Classifier for Out-
come Prediction (Deal= 1) and Their Estimated Marginal Effects. The left
panel is the result from Camerer et al. [2019] (Experiment 1) and the right
panel is the result from Experiment 2. The pie sizes are excluded.
large amount of data is terrific. For machine learning applications, there is
(almost) no such thing as too much data.
Furthermore, a kind of theory-testing can still be done in a machine learn-
ing framework. In our example, the revelation principle, along with other
restrictions, still delivers predictions about what will happen in equilibrium
which are highly independent of the unstructured behavior. Everything de-
pends on pie sizes. A lean predictive “machine” using only pie sizes should
therefore predict as accurately as one with many more features.
Our main finding, using National Taiwan University subjects and some
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small design changes, is a close replication of earlier results using Caltech
subjects. Agreements are often equal splits, even though the exact pie size is
only known to one side. Deal rates do increase with pie size, but there is a lot
of inefficiency—deal rates are too low—compared to revelation principle pre-
dictions. However, theory also predicts a break for uninformed offers for pies
of $4-6 compared to lower pie amounts, and this break is evident in the data.
There are some experience effects (deal rates go up across trials in an experi-
mental session). One session with twice-experienced subjects—repeating the
entire experimental session—did not produce results much closer to equilib-
rium (to our surprise).
There are only weak effects of gender. When females are informed, the deal
rate is a bit higher and uninformed (males) get a little less, but the evidence
is not statistically strong. While gender effects in bargaining are interesting,
a lot more statistical power is probably needed to establish whether there are
differences or not 12.
Finally, we hope these data and method inspire other experimenters from
a range of social sciences to measure a lot more about what goes in the
bargainers’ bodies and brains, and results from their typing or talking, on
during bargaining. For example, Forsythe et al. [1991a] allowed subjects
to transmit verbal messages during bargaining. At the time, methods of
analyzing natural language processing (NLP) were so primitive that they did
not do any sophisticated analysis of those rich data. What they wrote at the
time was:
Because of the unconstrained messages which pass between the
players, our bargaining game is too complicated to allow a detailed
strategic analysis. However, by the revelation principle, any Nash
equilibrium of this game is equivalent to some direct mechanism,
12And of course, gender differences are likely to vary wildly across the globe, so a serious
attempt to understand such differences must look at the influences of developmental life
cycle, biological factors such as hormones, and cultural variation.
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which specifies whether a strike should occur and how much each
bargainer should get as a function of the informed bargainer’s
announcement of the size of the pie.
That is, While they allowed messages and recorded them, they did not an-
alyze them at all because the resulting game—treating messages as strategy
choices—is too complicated to solve. Using the messages as data in machine
learning does not test a theory either, but it provides preliminary evidence
of how features of messages influence agreement rates. Such evidence could
provide inspiration for theory.
It is also notable that recording messages is very easy technically. NLP is
one area of machine learning which is now hugely successful and improving
by leaps and bounds every year. In general, machine learning methods are




Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix: Omitted Proof
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
First, we show that Lemma 1 holds for any p on the equilibrium path. In the
brand market, if µ∗m(p, 1) = 0, then µ∗h(p, 1) = 1, γ∗ = 0 and π∗i = π∗i (p, 1, eh).
However, for firm i, π′i(p, 1, em) > π∗i .
In the stand-alone market, if µ∗l (p, 0) = 0, then µ∗ = (1 − µm, µm, 0) for
some µm ∈ [0, 1]. If µm induces γ∗ = 0 , the argument for the brand market
applies. If µm induces some γ∗ > 0, (1−µm)qh +µmqm− p = (1−µm)1(qh ≥
p)(qh − p) + µm1(qm ≥ p)(qm − p) − s ≥ 0. For any s > 0, it follows
that p ∈ (qm, qh). For firm j where π∗j = π∗j (p, 0, em) = (1 − γ∗)p − ciem,
π′j(p, 0, el) = (1− γ∗)p− ciel > π∗j . µm can never induce γ∗ = 1 because firms
can only choose eh and there will be no incentive for consumers to inspect.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Consider the brand market first. Suppose there exists p∗ such that γ∗(p∗, 1) =
0 and µ∗m(p∗, 1) < 1. For p∗ to construct an equilibrium, it must be that
Σk∈{h,m}µ∗ku(k)−p∗ ≥ 0. In addition, there exists i such that π∗i = π∗i (p∗, 1, eh) =
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p∗ − cieh. However, π′i = π′i(p∗, 1, em) = p∗ − ciem > π∗i . eh cannot be the
best response of any firm. Similarly, in the individual market, the only best
response of effort is el if γ∗ = 0.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3
Suppose some quality-level good x is produced in both markets. Denote the
expected revenue in brand market pb and that in individual market pi. Then
∃c1, c2 such that
pb − c1ex − F ≥ pi − c1ex and pb − c2ex − F < pi − c2ex.
The two inequalities contradict each other.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Lemma 1.1 and 1.2 show that when inspection is impossible, the only consis-
tent belief µ∗(p, 1) = (0, 1, 0) and µ∗(p, 0) = (0, 0, 1). Given this belief, in the
consumption stage, consumers purchase if p ≤ ql in the stand-alone market,
and if p ≤ qm in the brand market. Since there is no competition, if firm i
joins the brand, (p∗i , e∗i ) = (qm, em). Otherwise, (p∗i , e∗i ) = (ql, el).





s.t. qm − ciem − F ≥ ql − ciel ∀ci ≤ ĉ
ql − ciel ≥ qm − ciem − F ∀ci > ĉ
(A.1)
The constraints yield F = qm − ql − (em − el)ĉ. The maximization problem
can be re-written as the following:
max
{ĉ}
ĉ[qm − ql − (em − el)ĉ] (A.2)
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The objective function is a concave quadratic function of c, so global max-
imum exists. The first-order condition yields qm − ql − 2(em − el)c = 0.
Therefore, ĉ = 12
qm−ql
em−el
and F ∗ = qm − ql − (em − el)ĉ = qm−ql2 .
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.2
We first show the existence of the inspection equilibrium. Denote the equi-
librium high, medium and low prices ph, pm, and pl, respectively. In the
consumption stage, consumers purchase if Σk∈{h,m,l}µIku(k)−p ≥ 0. If p = pl,
µ = (0, 0, 1). If p = pm, µ = (0, 1, 0). Therefore, consumers’ purchasing deci-
sion can be simplified to purchase if pl ≤ ql, pm ≤ qm and if ph ≤ µhqh+µmqm
with no inspection and ph ≤ qh with inspection and the quality is qh.
µ(p, b) =

(0, 1, 0) if (p, b) = (pm, 1)
(ρ, 0, 1− ρ) if (p, b) = (ph, 0)
(0, 0, 1) otherwise
where ρ = c
c+σ(1−c̄) is the probability that a high-price good is of high quality.
Therefore, the optimal inspection decision γ(p, b) = 0 if (p, b) = (pl, 0) or
(pm, 1).
If (p, b) = (ph, 0), consumers inspect if
ρ(qh − ph)− k ≥ ρqh + (1− ρ)ql − ph. (A.3)
If the inequality holds with equality, consumers are indifferent between in-
spection and no inspection, any γ ∈ [0, 1] is optimal. Hence, in equilibrium,
(1 − ρ)(ph − ql) = s. Supporting the equilibrium, consumers may as well
choose γ = ph−pl
ph
.
Next, we solve for firms’ optimal decisions. It is clear to see that branded
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p− ciel if (pi, ei) = (ql, el)
p− cieh if (pi, ei) = (ph, eh)
(1− γ∗)p− ciel if (pi, ei) = (ph, el)
Given consumer’s indifference constraint in inspection, firms with high
effort can at most extract ph = ρqh + (1 − ρ)ql. An off-equilibrium belief
which supports this equilibrium is that for any price p′ > ph, consumers
assign probability 1 to quality ql. The upper bound of the high price and
consumers’ indifference condition in inspection pin down high price ph and
the probability that low-quality firms charge a high price σ:
(ph, σ) =
qh + ql +
√




qh − ql − 2k −
√




or qh + ql −
√




qh − ql − 2k +
√




if k ≤ qh−ql4 .
We will show in the end that these choices of firms are incentive com-
patible and that without further assumptions on the external parameters,








guaranteed to construct an equilibrium for arbitrarily small k.




s.t. qm − ciem − F ≥ max.{ph − cieh, ql − ciel} ∀ ci ∈ [c, c̄]
(A.4)
The constraint can be simplified to F = −(ph − qm) + (eh − em)c and





c. The objective function can be re-written as a uni-variable










Next we check for incentive compatibility for individual firms. To support
the equilibrium, the following inequalities must hold:
(eh − el)c ≤ γph ≤ (eh − el)c̄
Since γ = ph−ql
ph
, the inequalities can be simplified to ph−ql
eh−el
∈ [c, c̄]. Moreover,




































> 0. The incentive
constraints are satisfied. Moreover, for ph to be higher than qm, it must be
that k < 14[qh−ql]{[qh − ql]
2 − [(qm − ql)− (qh − qm)]2} if qh − qm < qm − ql.
Finally, we establish the condition for which the optimal probability of




and ρ = c
c+σ(1−c̄) is the probability that an individual good with price ph

















λ = c1−c̄+c is the fraction of high quality firms in the individual market. Then













If λ ≤ 12 , the inequality always holds. If λ >
1
2 , the inequality holds if and
only if k < [qh− ql]λ(1−λ). Observe that dλ(1−λ)dλ = 1− 2λ, which is negative
if λ > 12 . If λ is bounded above by some λ̄ < 1, λ(1−λ) is bounded below by
λ̄(1 − λ̄). Then as long as k ≤ k̄ = [qh − ql]λ̄(1 − λ̄), inspection equilibrium
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Denote k̄ = [qh− ql]λ̄(1− λ̄) and k̃ = 14[qh−ql]{[qh− ql]
2− [(qm− ql)− (qh−
qm)]2}, then inspection equilibrium exists if k ≤ k∗, where
k∗ =
 k̄ if qh − qm ≥ qm − qlmin.{k̄, k̃} otherwise
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Denote the inspection equilibrium welfare VI =
∫ c
0 ph − eh · cdc+
∫ c̄
c qm − em ·
cdc +
∫ 1
c̄ ql − el · cdc and benchmark equilibrium welfare VB =
∫ ĉ
0 qm − em ·
cdc+
∫ 1
ĉ ql − el · cdc. If ĉ > c,
VI − VB = (ph − qm)c−
1
2(eh − em)c













+ ph − ql
eh − el
]




























If ĉ < c,








− qm − ql
em − el
]








. Therefore, VI − VB > 0.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.4
To prove Proposition 1.4, it is helpful to establish that the contract fee is
lower in the inspection equilibrium. Denote the contract fee in the inspection






(ph−ql). It is straight-forward that FI decreases








Since the contract fee is lower in the inspection equilibrium, the firm with
component c is strictly better-off. If this marginal firm would join the brand
in the benchmark equilibrium, the firm benefits from the lowered contract fee.
If it does not join the brand in the benchmark case, its profit is ql−cel, which
is strictly lower than qh− ceh. In fact, all firms who have ci lower than c have
a higher profit in the benchmark case, the difference ph − qm − (eh − em)ci
decreases with ci. Therefore, the lower the cost component, the more profit
gain in the inspection equilibrium.
Moreover, for firms with cost components greater than c, they either profit
from a lower contract fee if their cost components are lower than c̄, or they
stay indifferent in the stand-alone market with profit ql − ciel.
Therefore, we can claim that firms earn a weakly higher profit in the
inspection equilibrium, and the increase in profit is a decreasing function of
ci.
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A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 1.5

















qh + ql +
√
(qh − ql)(qh − ql − 4k)
2 =




A.1.9 Proof of Corollary 1.1 and 1.2










]. Both c and c̄
are increasing functions of ph, which is a decreasing function of k. Therefore,
c and c̄ decrease with k. However, the marginal impact of inspection cost k
on c is greater than that on c̄. Therefore, as k decreases, the fraction of firms
joining the brand decreases.











]. Recall that in the first best case, the fraction




. Therefore, the fraction
of firms investing in medium quality approaches one half the socially optimal
mass as k approaches 0.
In terms of the brand-holder’s profit, recall that F = −(ph − qm) + (eh −









< 0. The contract fee F
decreases with ph, which decreases with k. Therefore, as the inspection cost
decreases, the contract fee decreases. As we established in Corollary 1.1, c̄−c
also decreases as k decreases. Therefore, as k decreases, the profit of the
brand-holder (c̄− c) · F decreases.
A.1.10 Other Equilibria
Lemma 1.3 implies that there may exist one other equilibrium other than
the benchmark equilibrium and the inspection equilibrium. Indeed, there is






equilibrium, the branded goods are of either high or medium quality, and the
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individual goods are always with low quality. Firms who invest in high quality
charge a high price. Firms who invest in medium quality randomize between
high and medium price. Firms who invest in low quality always charge a low
price. Consumers do not inspect if the price is medium or low. If the price is
high, consumers inspect with probability γ1.
Denote c1 the fraction of firms choosing high quality, ĉ1 the marginal type
of firm who is indifferent between accepting and not accepting the contract,
σ1 the probability that a medium-quality good is listed a high price and
ρ1 = c1c1+σ1(ĉ1−c1) the probability that a high-price good is of high quality.
Likewise, we solve for the equilibrium strategies with backward induction.
In the consumption stage, consumers purchase if pl ≤ ql, pm ≤ qm and ph ≤
ρ1qh + (1− ρ1)qm without inspection and ph ≤ qh with inspection and q = qh.




(0, 0, 1) if (p, b) = (pl, 0)
(0, 1, 0) if (p, b) = (pm, 1)
(ρ1, 1− ρ1, 0) if (p, b) = (ph, 1)
Consumers inspect upon high price if
ρ1(qh − p)− k ≥ ρ1qh + (1− ρ1)qm − p
Therefore, k = (1 − ρ1)(ph − pm). When the inequality holds with equal-
ity, consumers inspect with probability γ1 = ph−qmph upon observing ph of a
branded firm.
In firms’ decision stage, since consumers believe that all individual firms
are of low quality, stand-alone firms chooses investment level el and price at
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pl = ql. Also, pm = qm and ph = c1qh+σ1(ĉ1−c1)qmc1+σ1(ĉ1−c1) . If c1 satisfies
−F + ph − c1eh = −F + qm − c1em,
which yields c1 = ph−qmeh−em , then investment and pricing decisions are incentive
compatible. ph = c1qh+σ1(ĉ1−c1)qmc1+σ1(ĉ1−c1) and k =
σ1(ĉ1−c1)
c1+σ1(ĉ1−c1)










2 if k ≤
qh−qm





Finally, it is straight-forward that ĉ1 is equal to ĉ in the benchmark equi-
librium. In the contract stage, for the medium quality firms to randomize
between high and medium price, the profits that these two prices yield must
be the same. Moreover, consumers believe that individual firms must be of
low quality. Therefore, the brand-holder faces the same problem, and there-
fore chooses the same cut-off ĉ1 = ĉ = 12
qm−ql
em−el






λ1 = c1ĉ1 is the fraction of high quality branded firms in the brand. Similar
to the condition in the inspection equilibrium, σ1 is bounded between [0, 1] if
ρ1 > λ1. ρ1 > λ1 if k ≤ [qh − qm]λ1(1− λ1). Note that ĉ1 is a function of ex-
ogenous parameters and c1 is increasing in ph, which is a decreasing function







. The equilibrium exists
if k ≤ [qh − qm]λ̄1(1− λ̄1).
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B.1 Appendix: Figures
Figure B.1: Nutri-score
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
When consumer search is not possible, an equilibrium where all types of firms
except the l type adopt the label exists. If all types of firms adopt label, then
the consumer forms the belief that the firm is of type h if the label says L = 2,
assigns equal probability weight to mα and mβ when the label says L = 1.
The optimal pricing strategies for the firm of different types would be:
83
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2 84
• ph =

λ+ 1 + u0 if λ ≥ 1−ωω (1 + u0)
1 + u0 otherwise.
• pα = pβ = λ+12 + u0
• pl = u0
It is straight-forward to show that in this equilibrium, no type has an incentive
to deviate to other labelling strategies. If the h, mα or mβ doesn’t adopt the
label, then their profit after deviation will be π′ = u0, which is less than their
equilibrium profits. The l type has no incentive to deviate, since adopting
the label sends a signal to the consumer that the product has low qualities
on both dimensions.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
When the consumer is of niche type with probability 1, the h type firm adopts
the label and sets the price at ph = λ + 1 + u0, which is the willingness to
pay of the niche consumer. If both mα and mβ types adopt the label, then
l type prices at pl = u0, and doesn’t benefit from deviation since having a
label which says both attributes are of low quality does not increase profits.
Neither mα nor mβ has the incentive to give up on the label. If they do
so, the consumer infers that they are of type l, and the profit following such
deviation will be lower than the equilibrium profits.
In fact, this equilibrium is a special case of the mandatory equilibrium
with ω being equal to 1. We therefore defer the rest of the strategies to the
proof for Proposition 2.4.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Given the equilibrium beliefs, we solve for the equilibrium strategies and show
that these strategies are incentive compatible. First we set up some notations.
Denote the FoP Label L ∈ {0, 1, 2, φ} where the numbers represent the num-
ber of high-quality attributes and φ denotes no label and let the consumer’s
posterior after observing price signal p and label L be µ((α, β)|p,L). For







In period 5, the consumer makes purchase decisions. If the consumer con-
ducted search in the previous period, she learns the quality of the product.
In this case, the consumer purchases if and only if
Ui(α, β) ≥ p
where i ∈ {N,M}. If the consumer did not search, then the she purchases if
and only if the expected utility derived from the product is at least as high
as the price:
Σα∈{A,a}Σβ∈{B,b} µ((α, β)|p, s)Ui(α, β) ≥ p
B.4.2 Search Stage
In the search stage in period 4, the consumer’s beliefs on the equilibrium
path is summarized in Table B.1 The consumer only conducts search when
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(p,L) µh µα µβ µl
(ph, 2) 1 0 0 0
(pβ, 1) 0 0 1 0
(pα, φ) 0 11+σ 0
σ
1+σ
(pl, φ) 0 0 0 1
Table B.1: Posterior Beliefs on the Equilibrium Path
the signals are (p,L) = (pα, φ). It is clear to see that in all other cases,
the posterior beliefs assign probability 1 to a certain type. Therefore, the
consumer has no incentive to search.
Next we show that the mass consumer never searches in equilibrium. Re-
call that the consumer’s type-dependent utility functions are
UN = λ1(α = A)+ 1(β = B) + u0
UM = 1(β = B) + u0
When the signals (p,L) = (pα, φ), the product can be either (A, b) or (a, b).
The mass consumer derives the same utility level from these two products.
Therefore, she has no incentive to search. The niche consumer, on the other
hand, searches if
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0 − pα)− c ≥
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0) +
σ
1 + σu0 − pα.
The left-hand-side is the expected utility gain of the niche consumer if she
searches, which is the probability that the product is (A, b) and she purchases
at the listed price pα minus the search cost c. The right-hand-side is the
expected utility gain if she buys without searching. In this case, the expected
utility gain from the product is 11+σ (λ + u0) +
σ
1+σu0, and she pays pα with
certainty.
We will see the next stage that the niche consumer is indifferent between
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We now solve the optimal pricing strategies of the firm.
If the firm is of high type (θ = h), it expects that with the institutional
signal, it type is revealed. If it sets the price at 1 + u0, the consumer will
purchase the product regardless of her type. If it sets a price higher than this
level, only the niche consumer will purchase the product. Therefore, it sets
the price at the niche consumer’s willingness to pay if this level is sufficiently
high, or equivalently, if the fraction of the mass consumer is sufficiently low.
Otherwise,it sets the price at the mass consumer’s willingness to pay so that




λ+ 1 + u0 if λ ≥ 1−ωω (1 + u0)
1 + u0 otherwise.
Similarly, the mα type firm expects its type to be fully communicated.
Regardless of the type, the consumer derives utility level of 1 + u0 from the
product (a,B). Therefore, the mα type firm’s optimal pricing strategy is
pβ = 1 + u0.
The mα type firm is pooled with the low type firm in equilibrium. If
the consumer searches with certainty, the low type firm does not have the
incentive to mimic the mα type in the price signal. If the consumer does not
search in this case, then the low type firm mimics with certainty. Therefore,
the only equilibrium in this subgame when the signals are (pα, φ) is for the
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consumer to randomize search and the low type firm to randomize the price
it sets.
The low-type firm only randomizes between two prices: pα, the price the
mα type firm sets, and pl = u0, the consumer’s willingness to pay for its
product. If the low-type firm sets any other price pl > u0, no transaction
will take place due to the D1 criterion refinement. For any price deviation
p′l ∈ (u0, pα), the mass consumer certainly won’t buy. Therefore, regardless
of the response of the niche consumer, the mα type firm cannot benefit from
this deviation. D1 criterion requires that off-equilibrium beliefs for these
deviations should assign probability 1 to type l. Moreover, the off-equilibrium
beliefs assigning probability 1 on type l for price deviations p′ > pα also
survives D1 criterion refinement. If pl < u0, the low type firm can increase its
profit by setting a higher price, and the consumer will still buy the product
with certainty.
On the other hand, expecting the niche consumer to randomize search, the
mα type firm sets a price as high as possible, which leaves the niche consumer
with zero surplus. Combining the niche consumer’s indifference condition and
the mα type firm’s incentive to leave her zero surplus, we have
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0 − pα)− c =
1
1 + σ (λ+ u0) +
σ
1 + σu0 − pα = 0.











1There is another set of solution with σ = λ−2c+
√
λ(λ−4c)
2c > 1, but in our setting, σ is the
probability that the low type firm sets its price at pα, which should be in between 0 and
1.
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B.4.4 Signaling Stage
As we explained in the previous stage, one off-equilibrium belief which satisfies
the D1 criterion refinement is to assign probability 1 to all deviations (p,L) =
(p′, φ) for any p′ 6∈ {pα, u0}. With such off-equilibrium belief, regardless of
the type, the firm finds no incentive to deviate to any of these strategies. The
only potential concern is for a type to deviate to the equilibrium strategies
of other types. Therefore, we check for incentive compatibility for all types
of firm and show that they cannot benefit from any deviation. First, the mα
type does not want to mimic the mβ type because its equilibrium profit ωpα
is greater than that of the mβ type, 1 + u0. To see this,
ωpα ≥ ω̄pα









= 1 + u0
The mβ type firm does not deviate and mimic the mα type firm because
pα > 1 + u0, so the consumer will not purchase a mα product after search.
The mα firm’s expected profit if it mimics the mα firm is therefore ω(1−γ)pα,
which is equal to the low type firm’s equilibrium profit u0.
Finally, it is straight-forward to see that γ = ωpα−u0
ωpα
is in between 0 and
1 since ωpα > 1 + u0 > u0.
In our setting, u0 can also be normalized to 0. Then there exist equilibria
where consumers search with certainty, and the low type firm randomizes
prices between pα and 0, both giving it an expected profit of 0.
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
When label adoption is mandated, the strategies of the h and l types are
simple since information about their product qualities are fully transmitted
to the consumer. In the parameter range specified in Proposition 2.4, since
ω is sufficiently high, the h type firm prices at ph = λ + 1 + u0. To see this,
denote πh(p) the profit of h type if it sets the price at p. Then
πh(λ+ 1 + u0) = ω(λ+ 1 + u0)
≥ ω̄M(λ+ 1 + u0)
= 1 + u0





(λ+ 1 + u0)
= (1 + u0)
λ+ 1 + u0





≥ 1 + u0
= πh(1 + u0)









The mass consumer leaves the market upon observing (p,L) = (ph, 2). It is a
best response for the niche consumer to buy without search. In fact, since the
label says L = 2, neither type of the consumer has the incentive to search.
The search incentive is the same for l type firm. The l type firm can only
price at pl = u0, which is the willingness to pay the consumer has for its
product.
We now show that the strategies for themα andmβ types are also incentive
compatible. In the search stage, when the consumer observes (p,L) = (1 +
u0, 1), she assigns probability 1 to type mβ. Therefore, she has no incentive
to search. When the label reads L = 1 and the price is pMα , the consumer
forms the belief that the the firm is of type mα with probability 11+σM and
type mβ with probability σ
M
1+σM . As we will see later, p
M
α is greater than
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1 + u0. Therefore, the mass consumer leaves the market in this case. Just
as in Proposition 2.3, the niche consumer will be indifferent between buying
directly and searching, so it is also a best response for her to randomize search
with probability γM = 1− 1+u0
ωpMα
. This probability of searching makes the mβ
type firm indifferent between setting the price at 1 + u0 and pMα .
Similar to the pricing strategies in the voluntary equilibrium, here mα and
mβ types’ pricing strategies have to satisfy
1
1 + σM (λ+ u0 − p
M
α )− c =
1
1 + σM (λ+ u0) +
σM
1 + σM (1 + u0)− p
M
α = 0.
where pMα is the price that the mα type firm sets and σM the probability that
the mβ type firm sets the price at pMα in the mandatory equilibrium.




(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c)
2c
pMα = 1 + u0 +
λ− 1 +
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c)
2
To check for incentive compatibility, first, it is straight-forward that the h
and l types have optimal strategies. Since the label is mandatory, they cannot
mimic other types, and they receive all the gains from trade. The mα type
firm does not want to mimic the mβ type firm because its equilibrium profit
π∗α = ωpMα ≥ ω̄MpMα = 1+u0. Themβ type firm is indifferent between the two
prices pMα and 1 + u0 because the niche consumer searches with probability
γM .
To summarize, in the mandatory equilibrium, the h type firm sets the
price at ph = λ + 1 + u0, and the l type firm sets the price at u0. The mα




2 , and the mβ type firm
randomizes between pMα and 1 + u0. In equilibrium, the niche consumer will
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buy from the h and l type firm or when the label says L = 1 and the price is
1 + u0. When the label says L = 1 and the price is pMα , the niche consumer
will search with probability γM = 1− 1+u0
ωpMα
and buys if the product is (A, b).
The mass consumer buys if the label says L = 1 and the price is 1 + u0, or if
the price is u0. In all other cases, the mass consumer exits the market.
B.6 Other Equilibria
In this section we discuss all other possible equilibria in this game. First of
all, adopting the label is a dominant strategy for the type h firm. Therefore,
in terms of label adoption strategy, we only need to discuss 23 = 8 different
cases. Table B.2 summarizes these cases:
Adopt Don’t Adopt Note
mα,mβ, l Unravelling
mα,mβ l Unravelling
mα, l mβ l deviates
mβ, l mα l deviates
mα mβ, l mβ deviates
mβ mα, l Voluntary Equilibrium
l mα,mβ l deviates
mα,mβ, l
Table B.2: Possible Equilibria
In fact, we can rule out 5 out of 8 cases. Going through these cases, we
show that in the parameter range where the voluntary equilibrium exists,
there is no other equilibrium that survives D1 criterion refinement.
First, in the unravelling cases, the pricing strategies of type h and l are
straight-forward. Type h sets the price ph = λ + 1 + u0 and type l pl = u0.
An equilibrium where type mα and mβ separate with prices does not exist,
since in general the profits of the two types do not coincide. The type who
earns a lower profit will have an incentive to mimic the pricing strategy of
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the other type. Since the consumer does not search on the equilibrium path,
this is a valid deviation.
In the parameter range of our discussion, a semi-separating equilibrium
corresponds to the mandatory equilibrium.
We show in the following that an equilibrium where mα and mβ pool on
the same price does not survive D1-criterion refinement. Upon observing a
label that shows signal s = 1, the niche consumer searches if
µα(λ+ u0 − p)− c ≥ µα + (1− µα)(1 + u0)− p and
µα(λ+ u0 − p)− c ≥ 0
We can further simplify the conditions to the following:
p ∈ [1 + u0 +
c
1− µα


















Likewise, we can simplify the mass consumer’s search conditions to
p ∈ [u0 +
c
µα
















If themα andmβ firm pool on the same price p∗, when the consumer sees that
price, she should expect that the probabilities of the firm being type mα and
mβ are both 12 . Fixing µα =
1
2 , we can derive that the niche consumer searches
if and only if p∗ ∈ [1 + u0 + 2c, λ+ u0 + 2c] from the search conditions above.
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Therefore, p∗ ≤ 1+u0+2c, for any price above this level will yield equilibrium
profit of 0 for the mβ type. Similarly, the mass consumer searches if p∗ ∈
[u0 +2c, 1+u0−2c]. Therefore, p∗ cannot be in the range (u0 +2c, 1+u0−2c).
If p∗ is indeed in that range, π∗α = ωp∗ because the mass consumer will search
and will not buy from the mα type firm. The mα type can deviate to a price
p′ = 1 + u0 − 2c and increase its profit. p∗ cannot be in between (1 + u0 − 2c
and 1 +u0 either. If this is the case, the mass consumer exits the market and
the niche consumer buys with certainty. Then both types of firm can deviate
to the price 1 + u0, which the niche consumer still accepts.
We now discuss all other possible pooling equilibria. If p∗ ∈ [u0, u0 + 2c],
the conditions for p∗ to be an equilibrium are the following:
• ω is sufficiently low such that ω(1 + u0) < p∗
• For any deviation p′ > p∗,
i if p′ ∈ (1 + u0, u0 +
λ−1+λ−1−4c
2 ) ∪ (λ+ u0 −
λ−1−λ−1−4c




ii if p′ ∈ [u0 +
λ−1+λ−1−4c
2 , λ+ u0 −
λ−1−λ−1−4c
2 ],
µα(p′) < cλ+u0−p′ .
• For any deviation p′ < p∗ and p′ > ωp∗,
i if p′ ∈ [u0 + 1+
√
1−4c





µα(p′) > 1 + u0 − p′
ii if p′ ∈ [u0 + 1−
√
1−4c





µα(p′) > 1− c1+u0−p′ .
In the range of deviation [u0 +
λ−1+λ−1−4c
2 , λ+ u0 −
λ−1−λ−1−4c
2 ], compared to
themβ type firm, themα type firm benefits for a larger set of best responses of
the niche consumer. Therefore, D1-criterion requires that the off-equilibrium
beliefs in this range should assign probability 1 to the mα type. There is a
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continuum of pooling equilibria p∗ ∈ [u0, u0 + 2c] if ω is sufficiently small,
but none survives D1-criterion refinement. Similar contradiction can also
be found in the range where the mass consumer searches, which we omit
here. The other possible range of pooling prices is p∗ ∈ [1 + u0, 1 + u0 + 2c].
The violation for D1 criterion refinement is similar. In order to support the
equilibrium, the off-equilibrium beliefs are required to have sufficiently low
weight on mα type when the niche consumer may want to conduct search.
However, D1-criterion requires that in this range, the off-equilibrium belief
should have all the probability weight on the mα type.
Finally, we discuss the last case where only type h adopts the label. An
equilibrium wheremα andmβ pool on the same price does not exist for similar
reasons as previously shown. For sufficiently small µl, there are similar best
response conditions with different thresholds. The range of deviation which
may induce the consumer to search is therefore non-empty. As long as this is
the case, D1-criterion requires to put probability 1 on the type which can still
profit after the consumer searches. Therefore, no equilibrium where mα and
mβ type pool on the same price survives D1-criterion refinement. There is
no semi-separating equilibrium either, since type l has an incentive to mimic
every price, and in general the conditions for such an equilibrium to hold are
not satisfied. Likewise, an equilibrium where mα and mβ type set different
prices does not exist. Since type l will have an incentive to mimic both types,
mβ will deviate to a slightly higher price than its equilibrium price.
We have examined all possible equilibria and shown that in the parame-
ter range where the voluntary equilibrium exists, the only other equilibrium
which survives D1-criterion is the mandatory equilibrium.
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B.7 Comparision between the Mandatory and
Voluntary Equilibrium
B.7.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
In the mandatory equilibrium, the mβ type firm sets the price at pMα with
probability σM = λ−1−2c−
√
(λ−1)(λ−1−4c)
2c , whereas the l type firm mimicks the




2c . Since the exante probability
of firms types are equal, we only need to show that σM > σ.




(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c) + 1
⇔ λ2 − 4cλ > 1 + 2
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c) + λ2 − λ− 4cλ− λ+ 1 + 4c
⇔
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c) < λ− 1− 2c
⇔ 4c2 > 0
Since consumer’s search cost c is positive, σM > σ always holds. Lemma 2.1
is proven.
We now show Corollary 2.1.
pMα < pα ⇔ 1 + u0 +
λ− 1 +
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c)







(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c) + 1 <
√
λ(λ− 4c)
The inequality in the last line is shown to hold in Lemma 2.1. Therefore,
we can conclude that the mα type firm sets a lower price in the mandatory
equilibrium.
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B.7.2 Proof of Proposition 2.5
The first part of Proposition 2.5 states that γM < γ, but the expected search
cost of the consumer is higher in the mandatory equilibrium.
First, we show that γM < γ. Note that γM is such that the mβ type
firm is indifferent between setting the price at pMα and 1 + u0. Therefore, γM
satisfies (1− γM)pMα = 1 + u0. Similarly, γ satisfies (1− γ)pα = u0.









Since we know from Corollary 2.1 that pMα < pα and 1 + u0 > u0, it is




. Therefore, γM < γ. Conditioning
on the niche consumer being indifferent between search and buying directly,
the probability that the niche consumer searches is lower in the mandatory
equilibrium than in the voluntary equilibrium.
We now show the second part of Proposition 2.5. In expectation, the
consumer searches more in the mandatory equilibrium than in the voluntary
equilibrium. In the voluntary equilibrium, the expected probability that the
consumer will encounter the signal bundle which induces search is 14(1 + σ).
The mα type firm always produces such a signal bundle, and the l type
firm does so with probability σ. Therefore, the probability that the niche
consumer searches is 14(1+σ)γ. Likewise, for the niche consumer, the expected
probability of search in the mandatory equilibrium is 14(1 + σ
M)γM . In the
following, we will show that (1 + σM)γM > (1 + σ)γ, which completes our
proposition. First, note that σ satisfies 11+σ (λ + u0) +
σ
1+σu0 = pα. After re-
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2 98
arrangement, we have (1 + σ) =. Similarly, (1 + σM) = λ−1
pMα −(1+u0)
. Therefore,
(1 + σM)γM > (1 + σ)γ ⇔ λ− 1
pMα − (1 + u0)
















2 ]− (1 + u0)





















To simplify the expression, denote x = λ − 1 +
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c) and
y = λ+
√
λ(λ− 4c). Then the inequality can be written as
(1 + σM)γM > (1 + σ)γ ⇔ λ− 1
x
ωx− 2(1− ω)(1 + u0)




ωy − 2(1− ω)u0
y + 2u0
⇔ λ− 1
x+ 2(1 + u0)












⇔ y(y + 2u0)(λ− 1) > x(x+ 2(1 + u0))λ
⇔ (λ− 1)[λ2 − 2cλ+ u0λ+ (λ+ u0)
√
λ(λ− 4c)]
> λ[λ2 − λ− 2cλ+ u0λ+ (λ+ u0)
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c) + 2c− u0]
⇔ (λ− 1)
√
λ(λ− 4c) > λ
√
(λ− 1)(λ− 1− 4c)
⇔ (λ− 1)2(λ2 − 4cλ) > λ2[(λ− 12)− 4cλ+ 4c]
⇔ λ2 − (λ− 1)2 − λ > 0
⇔ λ− 1 > 0
Since it is assumed that λ > 1, we can conclude that the expected search cost
in the mandatory equilibrium is higher than that in the voluntary equilibrium.
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B.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Since there is no competition, total welfare is simply the producer’s surplus.
Denote the welfare in the voluntary equilibrium




4(1 + u0) +
1
4[σω(1− γ)pα + (1− σ)u0]
and that in the mandatory equilibrium










It can be shown that the difference of total welfare between the mandatory
and the voluntary equilibrium, V M − V = 14(p
M
α − pα) is negative, since we
have established in Corollary 2.1 that pMα < pα.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Basics for Experiment 2
C.1.1 Summary Statistics for Different Pies and Treat-
ments
In this section, we report the summary statistics for different pies and treat-
ments in Supplementary Table C.1. From this table, we can see that no
matter in which treatment the probability of disagreements decreases with
pie size. Also, conditional on reaching a deal, players’ payoffs increase with
pie size. This pattern can be observed in Supplementary Figure C.1 and C.2
as well.
In addition, surplus loss due to disagreements and the value of private
information generally increase with pie size. Similar empirical patterns occur
in all treatments. Therefore, we confirm that the first result in Camerer et al.
[2019] is robust from different treatments.
Result C.1. Deal rates and payoffs are increasing with the pie size.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Pie Size
Male Informed Session
Figure C.1: Mean payoffs by pie size and subject type, rounds ending in a
deal. The blue bars represent the average payoff of informed players and the
red bars are for uninformed players. The standard errors (overlaid on the
























































1 2 3 4 5 6
Pie Size
High Stake Session
Figure C.2: Mean payoffs by pie size and subject type, rounds ending in a
deal. The blue bars represent the average payoff of informed players and the
red bars are for uninformed players. Since there is only one session for each
treatment, the standard errors can not be computed.
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics for Different Pies and Treatments
Treatment Pie Size 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean
Baseline Informed Payoffa 0.37 0.95 1.56 2.23 3.07 3.87 2.01
Treatment (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Uninformed Payoffa 0.63 1.05 1.44 1.77 1.93 2.13 1.49
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Deal Rate 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.69 0.73 0.81 0.61
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Surplus Lossb 0.58 1.04 1.39 1.25 1.36 1.16 1.13
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Information Valuec -0.11 -0.05 0.05 0.31 0.83 1.39 0.40
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10)
Female Informed Payoffa 0.45 1.02 1.66 2.34 3.09 3.94 2.08
Informed (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Uninformed Payoffa 0.55 0.98 1.34 1.66 1.91 2.06 1.42
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Deal Rate 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.66
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Surplus Lossb 0.46 0.89 1.06 1.18 1.26 1.27 1.02
(0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18)
Information Valuec -0.05 0.03 0.21 0.48 0.87 1.49 0.51
(0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13)
Male Informed Payoffa 0.35 1.03 1.65 2.37 3.18 3.97 2.09
Informed (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15)
Uninformed Payoffa 0.65 0.97 1.35 1.63 1.82 2.03 1.41
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15)
Deal Rate 0.47 0.51 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.62
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Surplus Lossb 0.53 0.98 1.13 1.35 1.48 1.57 1.18
(0.03) (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.19) (0.15)
Information Valuec -0.13 0.03 0.17 0.49 0.96 1.41 0.49
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.18)
Experienced Informed Payoffa 0.46 1.07 1.71 2.29 3.19 3.87 2.10
Uninformed Payoffa 0.54 0.93 1.29 1.71 1.81 2.13 1.40
Deal Rate 0.44 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.81 0.81 0.66
Surplus Lossb 0.56 0.91 1.10 1.10 0.93 1.17 0.96
Information Valuec -0.03 0.08 0.26 0.42 1.12 1.41 0.54
High Stake Informed Payoffa 0.40 0.93 1.58 2.26 3.09 3.95 2.04
Uninformed Payoffa 0.60 1.07 1.42 1.74 1.91 2.05 1.46
Deal Rate 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.73 0.77 0.65
Surplus Lossb 0.44 0.77 1.24 1.47 1.37 1.40 1.11
Information Valuec -0.11 -0.08 0.09 0.33 0.86 1.46 0.42
Means and standard errors (shown in parentheses) are calculated by treating
each session’s mean as a single observation. Since there is one session for expe-
rienced and high-stake treatment, the standard errors for these two treatments
are not computable. a Averages are calculated for deal games only. b Surplus
loss = the mean expected loss of pie due to strikes. c Information value = the
mean difference between the informed and uninformed payoffs.
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C.1.2 Focal Points
Supplementary Figure C.3 to Supplementary Figure C.6 show distributions
of uninformed player’s payoff conditional on reaching a deal in different treat-
ments. See Camerer et al. [2019] for the distribution of the baseline. Focusing
on the female-informed and male-informed sessions, as we pool the data from
all pairs that reached a deal, we can observe 84.9% of the payoffs are 0.5, 1,
1.5, 2, 2.5 or 3, matching values that are exactly halves of possible pie sizes.
In addition, equal-split is the most common outcome. Among female-
informed and male-informed treatments, 49.45% of the outcomes are equal-
splitting when pie size is small or medium (π ≤ $4). This is even more
common in female-informed sessions (55.98%) than male-informed sessions
(42.94%). Notice that when pie size is small, the predicted payoffs of the
efficient and equal-split equilibrium are the same (the top two rows in Sup-
plementary Figure C.3 to Supplementary Figure C.6).
When pie size is large (π ≥ $5), the efficient equilibrium and equal-split
equilibrium predict differently. The bottom row in Figure C.3 to Figure
C.6 show that the mode is at $2 and there are second modes at half the
pie. Pooling the data from female-informed and male-informed treatments,
25.59% of payoffs are $2. When pie size is $5, 18.9% of the payoffs are at the
equal-split equilibrium, while 13.0% of the payoffs are equal-splits when pie
size is $6. This empirical pattern is observed in all treatments and coincides
with the finding in Camerer et al. [2019]. Thus, the second result in Camerer
et al. [2019] is also replicated in Experiment 2.
Result C.2. In all treatments, when pie size is small or medium (π ≤ $4),
the modes of the uninformed player’s payoff distributions equal to half the pie;
when pie size is large (π ≥ $5), the modes are at $2, though there are second
modes at half the pie.







































































Figure C.3: Uninformed player’s payoff relative frequencies in female-
informed sessions (conditional on reaching a deal). The bin size is 0.1 and







































































Figure C.4: Uninformed player’s payoff relative frequencies in male-informed
sessions (conditional on reaching a deal). The bin size is 0.1 and the green
bar locates half the pie in each distribution.







































































Figure C.5: Uninformed player’s payoff relative frequencies in the experienced
session (conditional on reaching a deal). The bin size is 0.1 and the green bar







































































Figure C.6: Uninformed player’s payoff relative frequencies in the high stake
session (conditional on reaching a deal). The bin size is 0.1 and the green bar
locates the half of the pie in each distribution.
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C.1.3 Bargaining Dynamics
Supplementary Figure C.7 to Supplementary Figure C.10 show the dynamics
of mean bargaining positions across different points of time. From these
figures, we can see that no matter in which treatment, the informed player’s
offer increases with time, while the uninformed players’ demand decreases.
Therefore, we can first conclude that the empirical pattern found in Camerer
et al. [2019] is robust to the gender difference, experience and stakes.
Result C.3. In all treatments, the informed player’s offer increases, and the
uninformed player’s demand decreases with time.
Although the general dynamic changes are similar, there are still some
differences in information transmission among treatments. Comparing the
female-informed and male-informed treatments, information transmission in
male-informed sessions is better than that in female-informed sessions since
in the latter the final positions are not clearly separated for pie size greater
than $4.
On the other hand, from Supplementary Figure C.9, we can see that the
experienced treatment has the worst information transmission because the
range of the average final position is only about $0.6. By contrast, the high-
stake session has the best information transmission when pie size is small, in
which there is clear separation in the uninformed player’s final position.














































Figure C.7: Mean Bargaining Position for All Pie Sizes in Female Informed
Session (All Rounds Pooled). The mean position is sampled at every second














































Figure C.8: Mean Bargaining Position for All Pie Sizes in Male Informed
Session (All Rounds Pooled). The mean position is sampled at every second
and standard errors are overlaid.














































Figure C.9: Mean Bargaining Position for All Pie Sizes in the experienced
session (All Rounds Pooled). The mean position is sampled at every second














































Figure C.10: Mean Bargaining Position for All Pie Sizes in high stake session
(All Rounds Pooled). The mean position is sampled at every second and
standard errors are overlaid.
Appendix C. Appendix to Chapter 3 110
C.1.4 Deadline Effect
Supplementary Figure C.11 and Supplementary Figure C.12 show the CDF
of deals over time , which sharply increases as the deadline approached. This
“endgame effect” is common to all pie sizes in both treatments. Basically,
more than half of the deals are made in the last two seconds no matter in
which session. Furthermore, deals are reached sooner when the pie is larger.
This confirms the last empirical trend identified in Camerer et al. [2019]. One
thing worth noticing here is that in the experienced session, players are more
likely to reach a deal in the early seconds when pie size is large.
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Male Informed Session
Figure C.11: Cumulative Distribution of Deal Times by Pie Size in Female
and Male Informed Sessions. Median deal times in different pie sizes are
marked by a cross.






































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time [SEC]
High Stake Session
Figure C.12: Cumulative Distribution of Deal Times by Pie Size in the expe-
rienced and high stake. Median deal times in different pie sizes are marked
by a cross.
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C.2 Comparison with Theoretical Predictions
C.2.1 Non-parametric Hypothesis Tests
In this section, we conduct non-parametric hypothesis tests on the predictions
of Lemma 1. First of all, Lemma 1 predicts that deal rates increase with pie
sizes. Table 2 and Figure 2 show this monotonic pattern in both female-
informed and male-informed sessions. A non-parametric Wilcoxon-type test
for trend in deal rates over pie sizes reject the null hypothesis of no trend
(female-informed sessions: z = 11.98, p < 0.001, two-sided; male-informed
sessions: z = 12.63, p < 0.001, two-sided).
The second prediction of Lemma 1 is that the uninformed player’s payoff
monotonically increases with pie size, conditional on reaching a deal. A non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test (with adjustments for ties) rejects the null hy-
pothesis that distributions of uninformed player’s payoff are the same for each
pie size in both treatments (female-informed sessions: χ2(5) = 1284.828, p <
0.001, two-sided; male-informed sessions: χ2(5) = 1140.427, p < 0.001, two-
sided). In addition, a non-parametric Wilcoxon-type test rejects the null
hypothesis of no trend in the payoffs across pie size conditional on reaching
a deal (female-informed sessions: z = 34.92, p < 0.001, two-sided; male-
informed sessions: z = 32.93, p < 0.001, two-sided).
Lastly, Lemma 1 also predicts that the uninformed player’s payoff is iden-
tical for all pie sizes where the deal rate is 1. In particular, the efficient
equilibrium predicts that the deal rates would be 1 for all π ≥ $4. However,
the equal-split equilibrium predicts the deal rate is 1 only when pie size is
6. Table 1 and Figure 2 show that strikes are common even when pie size
is 6 in both female-informed and male-informed sessions. A non-parametric
Kruskal–Wallis test for equality of payoff distributions (with corrections for
ties) rejects the null hypothesis that mean payoffs of the uninformed player,
conditional on reaching a deal, are the same for pie sizes 4, 5, and 6 (female-
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informed Session: χ2(2) = 95.623, p < 0.001, two-sided; male-informed Ses-
sions: χ2(2) = 79.255, p < 0.001, two-sided).
C.2.2 Regression Analyses
In this section, we perform two sets of linear regressions to test the theoretical
predictions on deal rates and the uninformed player’s payoffs conditional on
reaching a deal.
Deal Rate Regression
First of all, we predict whether a deal is reached or not using the following
specification:
yiust = α0 + α1πiust + α2diust (πiust − 4) + Xiustβ + εiust.
Here, yiust is the dummy variable for reaching a deal between informed player i
and uninformed player u in period t of session s. The spline term diust (πiust − 4)
consists of two parts: the dummy variable diust for pie sizes greater or equal
to 4 and (πiust − 4) as the increment of pie size beyond 4. The efficient equi-
librium predicts that the deal rate is 25 when pie size is 1, increasing by
1
5 per
unit in pie size. Hence, the deal rate would be 1 when pie size is greater or
equal to 4. In contrast, the equal-split equilibrium predicts the deal rate to
be 27 when pie size is 1, increasing by
1
7 per unit in pie size. Therefore, the




5), while the equal-split
equilibrium predicts that (α0, α1, α2) = (17 ,
1
7 , 0).
Table C.2 reports the regression results. All models include standard er-
rors clustered at the session level, to account for dependence in residuals
within a particular session. Model A provides the baseline results predict-
ing deal rate with pie size and the spline term, using pooled data from both
female-informed and male-informed sessions. Models B includes session con-
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trols, and Model C employs controls at the level of individual subject pairs
(the smallest grouping available). Model D drops these controls and adds an
indicator term controlling for female-informed sessions (Female = 1), as well
as an indicator term for the last 60 rounds of the experiment (rounds 61–120)
to capture the effect of experience. Model E adds interactions between female-
informed/experience and pie size/spline. In model F, we further control for
informed and uninformed player’s risk preference (ln(ρi), ln(ρu)) and degree
of loss aversion (λi, λu), as well as the initial offer and initial demand. Model
G drops the female-informed session indicator and other controls but adds
session-level controls. Model H adds back the controls for risk preference,
loss aversion and the initial bargaining positions.
In all models, the coefficient on pie size is always significantly positive,
ranging from 6.3% to 8.1%. This estimate is robust to different specification,
which supports the prediction of the IC condition in Lemma 1. Yet, the slope
coefficient on pie size is smaller than predicted from either equilibrium. The
constant term from Model A is about 0.42 which is larger than predicted
from either equilibrium. The spline term is negatively significant only when
we control for interactions with experience, indicating that the players tend
to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium at the beginning, but later move
toward the equal-split equilibrium. In fact, experience plays an important
role in reaching a deal. Players are roughly 8.5% more likely to reach a deal
in later rounds. Also, the slope coefficient on the pie size is also significantly
smaller in later rounds. On the other hand, it seems like whether the informed
player is female is not a significant factor to predict deal rate. The dummy
variable for female-informed sessions is only barely significant in Model E.
Lastly, the initial position of the uninformed player would also affect deal
rate.
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Wage Regression
Similarly, we perform linear regressions to test the focal-split predictions re-
garding payoffs conditional on players reaching a deal. The efficient equilib-
rium predicts equal-splits when the pie is small, and the uninformed player’s
conditional payoff would be 2 when the pie size is 4 or greater. The equal-split
equilibrium predicts a 50/50 split for all pie sizes. We test these predictions
with the following specification:
wiust = α0 + α1πiust + α2diust (πiust − 4) + Xiustβ + εiust,
where wiust is the uninformed payoff (conditional on reaching a deal) agreed
upon by informed player i and uninformed player u in period t of session





equal-split equilibrium predicts (α0, α1, α2) = (12 ,
1
2 , 0).
In all specifications, the coefficient of pie size is positively significant, rang-
ing from 0.28 to 0.35, but these point estimates are lower than the theoretical
prediction. The spline term is roughly −0.16 (Model A to D), which is neg-
atively significant. However, as we control for interactions between whether
the informed player is female and experience, the spline term is no longer
significant (Model E and F). This indicates that players in female-informed
sessions are slightly more likely to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium than
those in male-informed sessions. On the other hand, the constant term ranges
from 0.24 to 0.34 (Model A to D), which is also lower than the theoretical
prediction. Model F and H includes risk preferences, degrees of loss aver-
sion and initial positions and find that initial offers play a significant role in
determining final payoffs of the uninformed.
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Pie 0.0649*** 0.0649*** 0.0634*** 0.0649*** 0.0809*** 0.0786*** 0.0756*** 0.0729***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0084) (0.0106) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0088) (0.0075)
Spline at π = $4 -0.0253 -0.0260 -0.0183 -0.0258 -0.0509** -0.0491** -0.0412** -0.0394**
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0139) (0.0168) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0137) (0.0119)
Female 0.0451 0.0722* 0.0638
(0.0275) (0.0343) (0.0369)
Rounds 61− 120 0.0270 0.0872*** 0.0893*** 0.0846*** 0.0864***
(0.0185) (0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0193)
Female × Pie -0.0107 -0.0118
(0.0206) (0.0201)
Female × Spline 0.0211 0.0206
(0.0322) (0.0324)
Rd.61-120 × Pie -0.0215** -0.0213** -0.0207** -0.0204**
(0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0062) (0.0066)
Rd.61-120 × Spline 0.0298 0.0296 0.0297 0.0295









Initial demand -0.0302* -0.0327*
(0.0135) (0.0130)
Initial offer 0.0160 0.0144
(0.0107) (0.0112)
Constant 0.4245*** 0.4246*** 0.4261*** 0.3893*** 0.3457*** 0.4122*** 0.3812*** 0.4549***
(0.0238) (0.0290) (0.0233) (0.0210) (0.0260) (0.0573) (0.0259) (0.0511)
Observations 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920
AIC 10,553.52 10,499.13 8,623.804 10,532.82 10,527.62 10,455.81 10,494.74 10,416.78
BIC 10,574.45 10,513.09 8,637.758 10,567.71 10,562.51 10,490.70 10,529.63 10,451.67
Session Controls No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Pair Controls No No Yes No No No No No
Notes. Coef., coefficient; SE, standard errors. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the session level.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Pie 0.3527*** 0.3518*** 0.3299*** 0.3534*** 0.3208*** 0.2831*** 0.3402*** 0.2938***
(0.0180) (0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0218) (0.0293) (0.0173) (0.0233)
Spline at π = $4 -0.1641** -0.1619** -0.1534** -0.1653** -0.1192 -0.1246 -0.1390** -0.1390**
(0.0447) (0.0455) (0.0452) (0.0455) (0.0725) (0.0785) (0.0358) (0.0445)
Female 0.0060 -0.1249 -0.1591
(0.0599) (0.0868) (0.1006)
Rounds 61− 120 0.0338 -0.0217 0.0116 -0.0292 0.0031
(0.0217) (0.0289) (0.0273) (0.0335) (0.0333)
Female × Pie 0.0424 0.0260
(0.0322) (0.0379)
Female × Spline -0.0475 -0.0390
(0.0918) (0.0931)
Rd.61-120 × Pie 0.0215 0.0158 0.0240 0.0191
(0.0178) (0.0143) (0.0196) (0.0160)
Rd.61-120 × Spline -0.0433 -0.0127 -0.0474 -0.0202









Initial demand 0.0365* 0.0344*
(0.0154) (0.0139)
Initial offer 0.2857*** 0.2887***
(0.0482) (0.0455)
Constant 0.2617*** 0.2636*** 0.3408*** 0.2394** 0.3350*** 0.0890 0.2773*** 0.0539
(0.0503) (0.0489) (0.0566) (0.0832) (0.0645) (0.1541) (0.0445) (0.1280)
Observations 5,058 5,058 5,058 5,058 5,058 5,058 5,058 5,058
AIC 8,647.621 8,572.667 5,678.255 8,647.008 8,637.756 7,743.683 8,572.392 7,644.838
BIC 8,667.207 8,585.725 5,691.312 8,678.651 8,670.400 7,776.327 8,605.036 7,677.481
Session Controls No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Pair Controls No No Yes No No No No No
Notes. Coef., coefficient; SE, standard errors. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the session level.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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